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Abstract
The relationship between business organizations and the sovereign agencies that regulate them
is being redefined domestically and abroad. In the context of corporate enforcement proceedings,
a critical challenge is how to achieve, most effectively, the timehonored public sector objectives of
punishment, deterrence, financial restitution and rehabilitation. At issue are important policy con-
siderations and at stake are the integrity and security of the commercial marketplace. The public
sector increasingly must balance the pressures of limited resources against the need to ensure that
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corporate citizens behave not only lawfully, but ethically and responsibly. One solution that has
been adopted is the imposition of independent, private sector oversight on companies and firms
that have been the targets or subjects of investigations. While its success to date has varied, this
evolving joint venture model is undeniably viable and it will become even more appealing to en-
forcement officials in this global era of fiscal restraint. Answering to a Higher Authority addresses
the evolution of private sector oversight and its implementation domestically and in capitalist na-
tions abroad. With equal importance, this Article explores various policy considerations and offers
refinements and solutions to all constituencies related to the selection,
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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between business organizations and the sovereign 
agencies that regulate them is being redefined domestically and 
abroad. In the context of corporate enforcement proceedings, a 
critical challenge is how to achieve, most effectively, the time-
honored public sector objectives of punishment, deterrence, financial 
restitution and rehabilitation. At issue are important policy 
considerations and at stake are the integrity and security of the 
commercial marketplace. 
The public sector increasingly must balance the pressures of limited 
resources against the need to ensure that corporate citizens behave 
not only lawfully, but ethically and responsibly. One solution that 
has been adopted is the imposition of independent, private sector 
oversight on companies and firms that have been the targets or 
subjects of investigations. While its success to date has varied, this 
evolving joint venture model is undeniably viable and it will become 
even more appealing to enforcement officials in this global era of 
fiscal restraint. 
Answering to a Higher Authority addresses the evolution of private 
sector oversight and its implementation domestically and in capitalist 
nations abroad. With equal importance, this Article explores various 
policy considerations and offers refinements and solutions to all 
constituencies related to the selection, retention and deployment of 
independent consultants and monitors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between corporations, private sector creatures of 
common and statutory law, and the sovereign entities that regulate them 
has long been a complex one. Indeed, in the United States, and in many 
other countries, it is continuously redefined. The enforcement dimension 
of corporate regulation has been especially challenging, and American 
officials and their Canadian and European counterparts have undertaken 
to develop legal theories and principles for assessing and addressing 
alleged organizational misconduct. Perhaps even more vexing in the 
corporate context has been the ongoing effort to carry out, in both 
criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, the undeniably legitimate and 
time-honored public sector responsibility for punishment, deterrence, 
financial restitution and rehabilitation. This is especially difficult 
because the very nature of a corporation requires approaches that are 
different from those adopted in cases involving malfeasance by 
individuals. 
This Article focuses on the imposition of independent private sector 
oversight of corporate operations as a means of ensuring that an 
enterprise acts as a responsible citizen. This Article also addresses the 
deterrent effects these resolution mechanisms have on corporations, as 
they are, in a sense, punitive in nature due to their attendant costs, risks 
and stigma. 
Scholars, the judiciary, legislators, enforcement officials, legal 
practitioners, and corporate directors and executives have analyzed 
exhaustively the causes of corporate wrongdoing.2 Typically, corporate 
wrongdoing arises from a confluence of some or all of the following: 
inadequate governance; greed; deluded or otherwise impaired judgment 
or even psychotic behavior in the C-suite; an institutional culture that is 
founded on and driven by problematic values; the pressures generated 
by what now appears to be a perpetual capitalist cycle of “boom and 
bust”; byzantine and often inconsistent regulations and administrative 
rules; and inept or lax enforcement thereof. Consequently, the 
rehabilitation of a firm that has run amok ethically and/or legally is a 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See generally Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the 
Post-Enron Era, 6 TRANS. TENN. J. BUS. L. 7 (2004); Marianne M. Jennings, The 
Disconnect Between and Among Legal Ethics, Business Ethics, Law, and Virtue: 
Learning Not to Make Ethics so Complex, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 995 (2004); Kurt 
Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will Be Scandal. Count on It., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2002, at C3. 
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decidedly different, and more arduous, undertaking than that crafted for 
an individual, even an egregious recidivist.3 
Not surprisingly, over the past several decades, regulators and 
enforcement officials have come to understand that when more than 
isolated misbehavior by lower or mid-level rogue employees is 
involved, the rehabilitation of a business organization takes considerable 
time and substantial resources, is fragile during its initial phases and can 
only be confirmed through a sustained period of holistic and impartial 
oversight.4 While some federal and state agencies may well have the 
expertise to conduct some or all facets of that evaluation, none have the 
resources to do so, particularly in light of recent sector-wide economic 
implosions and derailments.5 Many have, therefore, turned to the private 
sector for assistance in effectuating their enforcement goals. To date, the 
success of these joint ventures has varied widely and as a matter of 
public policy, they have generated vigorous debate and reassessment in 
both sectors.6 It is the premise of this Article that, when informed by a 
thorough understanding of its evolution, private sector oversight is not 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve 
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 703-07 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & 
Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 1713, 1720-21 (2007). 
 4. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 703-07.  
 5. Although the American housing bubble is the most recent example, boom and 
bust cycles have been endemic in capitalism since its earliest days. For instance, during 
the Dutch Tulip Mania of the early 17th century, tulip bulbs were the subject of mass 
market speculation and prices “skyrocketed to the point where the Dutch traded such 
personal belongings as furniture, jewels, and even land to acquire the most highly 
sought after tulips.” See Peter L. Cockrell, Subprime Solutions to the Housing Crisis: 
Constitutional Problems with the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, 17 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2010). The Tulip Mania also demonstrated that 
governments have attempted to manage and intervene in financial crises resulting from 
the boom and bust cycles long before their recent attempts to stabilize economies in the 
wake of the American housing bubble. See id. For additional discussion of sector-wide 
economic collapses and government responses, see also Watson, supra note 2, at 7, 10-
15; Eichenwald, supra note 2. 
 6. See generally Ford & Hess, supra note 3; Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate 
Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
793, 814-15 (2008); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3; Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of 
the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
89, 89 (2007); Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? 
Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1863, 1870-71 (2005). 
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only viable, it is perhaps the only realistic option in the current era of 
global fiscal restraint. 
Part I of this Article addresses private sector oversight of corporate 
affairs in both domestic and transnational settings. Part I.A.1 provides a 
historical overview of this practice in the United States, followed in Part 
I.A.2 by a discussion of key American agencies that have utilized 
private sector oversight pursuant to their statutorily-granted powers. Part 
I.A.3 provides case studies and addresses the methods adopted by the 
United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the 
“Commission”), the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”), the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(the “EPA”), and the United States Department of Labor (the “DOL”). 
Part I.B focuses on corporate oversight abroad, offering case studies 
from the United Kingdom and an overview of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Part II of this study considers the ramifications of independent 
private sector oversight; it reviews duties and responsibilities assumed 
by the independent monitor tasked with overseeing a corporate entity. It 
also addresses the selection, retention and ultimate deployment of an 
independent consultant or monitor, and explores various policy 
considerations attendant to private sector oversight of corporate entities. 
I. PRIVATE SECTOR OVERSIGHT OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
1. Historical Overview 
The notion of private sector oversight of corporate affairs—an 
amalgamation of American jurisprudence and enforcement and 
regulatory initiatives—is now well developed in the United States. Over 
roughly the past decade, American scholars and practitioners have 
identified and analyzed many facets of the model, particularly in the 
sovereign proceeding setting.7 No matter the designated moniker of the 
corporate overseer—auditor, consultant, ombudsperson, monitor, 
                                                                                                                 
 7. For a historical perspective of the evolution of the corporate monitor, see, e.g., 
Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683-89; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715-20; 
O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89-93. 
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receiver or review organization—this increasingly important role is the 
offspring of the judiciary and the legislature. As such, it has been driven 
by direct application of criminal law, quasi-criminal statutes, and 
administrative regulations to business organizations, both publicly-
traded and privately held.8 
Courts have long used their equitable powers in the name of justice, 
crafting remedies to address past wrongdoing and to prevent its 
recurrence.9 As Justice Brandeis observed almost a century ago, 
“[c]ourts have . . . inherent power to provide themselves with 
appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties,” 
which “includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court 
to aid judges in the performance of specific duties, as they may arise in 
the progress of a cause.”10 Indeed, the judiciary’s authority to appoint 
special masters and receivers is codified in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.11 
Private sector oversight of companies and firms has been spawned 
by the judicial expansion of legislatively created enforcement authority 
powers.12 Federal securities laws enacted in the wake of the 1929 stock 
market crash endow the SEC with broad discretion and a panoply of 
remedies to protect investors and financial markets.13 In this regard, 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683-89; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, 
at 1715-20; Greenblum, supra note 6. 
 9. See Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427, 432-39 
(2001). 
 10. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) (citations omitted). See Khanna & 
Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715 (discussing the authority of court-appointed special 
masters); Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform 
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 826-27 (1978). 
These court appointed agents are identified by a confusing plethora 
of titles: ‘receiver,’ ‘Master,’ ‘Special Master,’ ‘master hearing 
officer,’ ‘Monitor,’ . . . ‘Administrator’ . . . . Terminological 
confusion is compounded by functional confusion. A ‘master’ may 
at the same time gather information, make recommendations, and act 
to implement a decree. While the first two activities are part of the 
Master’s traditional role, the latter is not. 
Id. 
 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (masters) and 66 (receivers). 
 12. For a discussion of the rise and use of receivers in SEC enforcement actions, as 
part of the ancillary relief available under securities law, see Morrissey, supra note 9, at 
444-47. 
 13. See Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) § 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77a et 
seq. (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) § 21(d) (providing 
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some observers primarily credit the equitable powers of the courts in the 
context of federal securities laws, which provide injunctive relief to 
effectuate the Commission’s mandates.14 As the SEC’s use of 
injunctions blossomed, so did the scope of equitable relief that the 
Commission sought.15 The 1960s saw the expansion of what some 
observers call “ancillary relief”; with increasing frequency, the federal 
district courts imposed, in civil and enforcement proceedings, equitable 
remedies – such as the requirement of an accounting or the appointment 
of receivers – that were not explicitly recognized in the pertinent statutes 
and regulations, but were complimentary and logical extensions of 
statutory enforcement tools. It was an appealing approach in an era of 
judicial activism.16 
Judge Stanley Sporkin’s bias towards the use of consultants during 
his tenure as Enforcement Chief of the SEC may be viewed as another 
step in the evolution of the Commission’s use of the private sector to 
supplement its resources and fulfill its enforcement mandate.17 More 
recently, the SEC has utilized “undertakings” in negotiated resolutions 
of security law violations in order to transform corporate culture, 
including the appointment of independent private sector consultants.18 
Such measures were fully embraced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”),19 which granted the SEC the authority to seek, and the courts 
the authority to grant, “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or 
necessary for the benefit of investors.”20 
                                                                                                                 
for, among other remedies, “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary 
for the benefit of investors”) & 21C(a) (Commission’s authority to craft orders and take 
steps to “effect compliance”), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); Richard G. Wallace & Benjamin 
R. Dryden, Use of Independent Consultants as a Remedy in Securities Enforcement 
Actions, 42 BNA’S SEC. REG. & L. REP. 750 (2010). In his article, SEC Injunctions, 
Professor Morrissey details the use of injunctions under federal securities law as an 
example of an enforcement authority’s application for, and use of, the court’s equitable 
powers to carryout statutorily prescribed policy. See Morrissey, supra note 9. 
 14. See Morrissey, supra note 9, at 436-39; see also O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 
90, 93. 
 15. E.g., O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 90, 93; Barnard, supra note 6. 
 16. Morrissey, supra note 9, at 444-45; see O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 92-93. 
 17. Barnard, supra note 6. 
 18. Id. at 795-96. 
 19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) 
(2006)); see O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 93. 
 20. Exchange Act § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006). 
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In the same vein, the appointment of trustees in proceedings 
pursuant to remedial power in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”)21 is now viewed as a conceptual precursor 
to corporate monitorships.22 The same concept has resulted in the 
appointment of trustees by federal bankruptcy courts;23 Independent 
Review Organizations (“IROs”) by the Office of the Inspector General 
of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the 
“OIG”) in negotiated Corporate Integrity Agreements (“CIAs”); and 
stipulations and agreements by the United States Department of Labor 
(the “DOL”), and in enforcement proceedings brought under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”).24 
Without question, the most influential force in the development of 
private sector oversight of corporate organizations has been the 
application of criminal law to business organizations, building on the 
initial recognition of corporate liability in 1909.25 In 1991, the United 
States Sentencing Commission (the “Sentencing Commission”) 
promulgated Guidelines that focused on companies and firms.26 The 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006). 
 22. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 
1716-17. Still another recognized predicate to corporate monitorships, public law 
litigation aimed at restructuring and reforming public institutions, like RICO actions, 
often entails consent decrees that require a third party to oversee the implementation of 
remedial efforts. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL p. 186 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/civrico.pdf (“[C]ourts are vested with broad 
equitable powers to impose highly intrusive remedies to redress unlawful conduct, 
especially in institutional reform cases.”). 
 23. The authority to appoint a bankruptcy examiner is found in 11 U.S.C. 1104(c) 
(2010). Bankruptcy examiners are empowered to investigate the debtor and any matters 
relevant to the case or formation of a plan, and often do when it would be in the best 
interests of the creditors, equity stockholders or the estate. Statements of the 
investigation are then filed with the court. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2010); see also 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. 
 25. See New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 
(1909); see also James R. Copland, Regulation by Prosecution: The Problems with 
Treating Corporations as Criminals, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH, 
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/press_release_cjr13.pdf. 
 26. Though initially deemed mandatory, the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in nature. 
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Sentencing Guidelines have been amended since, most recently in 2010, 
to, among other things, include in an application note specific reference 
to the use of third party, professional “advisors” as a remedial step in 
furtherance of the implementation or enhancement of an organization’s 
compliance and ethics program.27 
Beginning in the early 1990s, federal prosecutors increasingly used 
non- and deferred prosecution agreements (“NPAs” and “DPAs”) as 
resolution vehicles in corporate investigations.28 Since 1993, the United 
States Department of Justice (the “DOJ” or the “Department”) has 
entered into at least 170 such agreements.29 As the DOJ has refined its 
approach to addressing corporate misconduct through measures short of 
criminal convictions, corporate monitors have become a mainstay 
component of resolution models.30 
                                                                                                                 
 27. AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 31, 34-35 (May 3, 2010). 
Officials within the DOJ have acknowledged the role of “independent compliance 
monitors” in transforming corporate cultures in the wake of wrongdoing. See Wall 
Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Detterrent for 
Willful Violations? Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. 
on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. (2010) 13 [hereinafter Breuer Testimony] (statement 
of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 28. See Greenblum, supra note 6; Prosecutors Adhered to Guidance but DOJ 
Could Better Communicate: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) [hereinafter Larence 
Testimony] (statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
Government Accountability Office). 
 29. Larence Testimony, supra note 28 (first resolution agreements executed in 
1993). The Department does not maintain statistics concerning the number of NPAs and 
DPAs it has executed that are immediately accessible to the public, and the GAO’s 
study, which identified 152 such agreements combined, is the latest government survey 
of such figures. More recently, private sector practitioners have undertaken a review of 
publicly available NPAs and DPAs entered into in the past decade, compiling statistics 
that align generally with those of the GAO reports and indicate a continuing trend in 
their use, raising the total number of such agreements through 2010 well over 170. See 
Melissa Aguilar, DPA-NPA Tally Marks Decade’s Second Highest, COMPLIANCE 
WEEK, Jan. 10, 2011. 
 30. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 682; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1721. 
Although not discussed in depth, the authors recognize that the histories of corporate 
compliance and ethics programs and criminal and quasi-criminal resolution agreements 
have been the subject of significant scholarship. Writers have traced the evolution of 
corporate compliance programs from antitrust prosecutions in the 1960s to the 
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 (which is coming full circle 
with the recent DOJ focus on violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). See 
Mark Brzezinski, Obama Administration Gets Tough on Business Corruption Overseas, 
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Over the past several decades in both Democratic and Republican 
administrations, the Department has focused decisively on corporate 
malfeasance at home and abroad. In particular, the DOJ has emphasized 
the importance of corporate compliance and ethics programs and, as a 
means of establishing or implementing them, the use of resolution 
agreements and corporate monitors.31 For instance, in response to a rash 
of high-profile acts of corporate deceit, in 2002, President George W. 
Bush created the Corporate Fraud Task Force (the “Task Force”), which 
remains active today and draws on the talents and resources of more 
than a dozen combined federal departments, agencies, U.S. Attorneys’ 
Offices and divisions of the Department. To date, the Task Force has 
obtained over a thousand corporate fraud convictions of corporations 
and senior executives, including hundreds of chief executive and 
financial officers, and vice presidents.32 Likewise, the DOJ has 
identified the prosecution of foreign corrupt practices as a top 
enforcement priority, bringing more Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the 
“FCPA”) cases in the past five years than in the balance of the statute’s 
history since its passage in 1977.33 In all of these complex cases, 
recognizing that a criminal conviction, particularly in a highly regulated 
industrial sector, can be the catalyst for the demise of an organization, 
                                                                                                                 
WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, (reflecting on Lanny Breuer’s, Chief of DOJ Criminal 
Division, speech at the Council on Foreign Relations May 4, 2010, in which he 
expressed the Obama administration’s goal of creating “‘a global consensus that 
corruption is unacceptable . . . .’”). This continued in defense industry reform in the 
1980s and the specific reference to compliance and ethics programs in the Guidelines in 
the 1990s, which were formally recorded in 2004 and revised in 2010. For a perspective 
on the evolution of corporate compliance programs, see, e.g., , Ford & Hess, supra note 
3, at 689-92. For a discussion of the evolution of deferred prosecution agreements, see, 
e.g., , Benjamin M. Greenblum, supra note 6, at 1866-71. 
 31. Brzezinski, supra note 30; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2001-2009, 30 (2009); The 
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/archive 
/dag/cftf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter The President’s Corporate Fraud Task 
Force]; see also AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at 31, 
34-35. 
 32. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 31, at 30; see also The 
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, supra note 31. 
 33. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 31, at 31; see also The 
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, supra note 31. 
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the DOJ has publicly endorsed the use of independent corporate 
monitors in resolution agreements with companies and firms.34 
A decade into the new millennium, there is no question that 
enforcement authorities and regulators now embrace the notion of 
independent private sector oversight in both the boardroom and the C-
Suite.35 As this Article discusses, the corporate monitor and its 
counterpart in analogous proceedings, when properly selected and 
deployed, promotes detection, prevention, and remediation of corporate 
misconduct, due in large part to the ability of the appointed individual to 
impart expertise and resources to the oversight of a corporation’s 
affairs.36 
2. Key American Agencies 
a. The United States Department of Justice 
i. Sentencing Guidelines 
A meaningful review of the evolution of the appointment of 
corporate monitors in federal criminal investigations necessarily begins 
with the Sentencing Commission. Created by Congress in 1984 as part 
of the Sentencing Reform Act, it serves as “an independent commission 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Breuer Testimony, supra note 27, at 12-13 (noting that as part of a resolution 
agreement, the DOJ may require that corporations retain “independent compliance 
monitors in appropriate cases”). Mr. Breuer further explained that the DOJ “believes 
that corporate guilty pleas and DPAs, corporate fines, and the imposition of 
independent compliance monitors serve the important criminal enforcement goals of 
specific deterrence, general deterrence, and rehabilitation.” Id. at 36. Later that month, 
Mr. Breuer again endorsed the use of independent compliance monitors in appropriate 
cases. Prepared remarks to Compliance Week 2010 – 5th Annual Conference for 
Corporate Financial, Legal, Risk, Audit & Compliance Officers, (May 26, 2010) 
(statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen.). 
 35. See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring 
the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1481, 1486 n. 17 (2007). Of the 152 resolution agreements the DOJ entered into 
since 1993, 94 were executed between 2004 and 2009; Corporate Crime: DOJ Has 
Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, But 
Should Evaluate Effectiveness, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 5, 16 
(2009), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-110 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 36. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 692; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
(Nov. 1, 2010); Breuer Testimony, supra note 27. 
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in the judicial branch of the United States.”37 The Sentencing 
Commission is charged with establishing “sentencing policies and 
practices for the Federal criminal justice system”38 and developing a 
“means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and 
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing” as described in the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure.39 
To this end, the Sentencing Commission is responsible for, among other 
things, creating and distributing to the federal courts guidelines, and 
related application notes and policy statements, for determining the 
sentences in criminal cases.40 
Initially, Congress required judges to calculate sentences pursuant 
to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the “Guidelines”).41 
In the wake of their promulgation over a period of two decades, the 
precepts and provisions of the Guidelines were litigated extensively.42 In 
2005, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory in nature.43 
Today, when imposing a sentence in a criminal case, a federal 
district judge must “consider,” inter alia, the Guidelines and their 
supporting application notes and policy statements.44 The Guidelines 
establish the presumptive parameters of a sentence “unless the [district] 
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of 
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). Today, the Commission is comprised of seven 
voting members and one nonvoting member. The President appoints the Commission’s 
seven voting members, with the advice and consent of the Senate; the Attorney General 
or the Attorney General’s designee is the nonvoting member. At most, three federal 
judges serve on the Commission, and, as a measure of political balance, no more than 
four members may be from the same political party. Id. 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). 
 39. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)-(2). 
 41. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989). 
 42. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569 (2002); United States v. Watts, 
519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995); United States v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 88-89 (1993); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 43. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). For purposes of appellate review, sentences calculated 
in accordance with the Guidelines are presumed reasonable. See United States v. Rita, 
551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005); see 
also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (explaining that “the Guidelines 
should be the starting point and the initial benchmark”). 
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[Sentencing Commission] . . . .”45 Judges may, for instance, deviate 
below a statutory minimum sentence “upon motion of the Government . 
. . so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation 
or prosecution of another person who committed an offense.”46 In the 
absence of a governing Guideline, the federal courts have license to 
impose such other sentences, as they deem appropriate under the 
circumstances presented.47 
Effective November 1, 1991, Chapter 8 of the Guidelines48 is 
designed to advance the dual prerogatives of “just punishment” and 
“deterrence.”49 The key provisions of the current version of the 
Organizational Guidelines have been in place, with only slight revisions, 
since 2004.50 Although no longer binding on the courts,51 the Guidelines 
are the presumptive rubric under which criminal punishment is imposed; 
they enunciate criteria for good corporate citizenship and serve as a 
framework for best practices in the area of ethics and compliance.52 
In part, the Organizational Guidelines are designed to create 
meaningful incentives for corporations to develop compliance and ethics 
programs that are tailored to the realities of their industrial sector and 
their particular organizations. These compliance and ethics programs 
should include the following components, among others: (1) the 
development of policies and procedures that prevent and detect criminal 
activity; (2) overall responsibility for the program seated in senior 
                                                                                                                 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). 
 46. Id. § 3553(e). 
 47. Id. § 3553(b)(1). 
 48. Hereinafter, the Chapter 8 Sentencing Guidelines shall be referred to as the 
“Organizational Guidelines.” 
 49. PAULA DESIO, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES (2010); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 8, introductory cmt. (2009). When the Organizational Guidelines were 
promulgated, they were mandatory. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 
(1989). 
 50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8, historical note (Nov. 1, 2010). The 
provisions are applicable to business organizations convicted of felony and Class A 
misdemeanor offenses, which, through the principle of vicarious liability, may be held 
criminally responsible for the acts of their agents. Id. § 8, introductory cmt. In this 
regard, an organization’s agents (e.g., individual employees) may be sentenced in 
accordance with other chapters of the Guidelines, alongside the organization. Id. 
 51. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). 
 52. Win Swenson & Joe Murphy, Changes Coming in Company Compliance 
Programs: The U.S. Sentencing Commission Adjusts the Rules, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
REPORT, 10 May 7, 2010 at 1. 
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personnel supported by adequate resources and operational authority 
who report to the organization’s board of directors or appropriate 
controlling authority charged with the oversight of the program; (3) a 
mechanism to exclude from senior-level, operational or authority 
functions of the corporation anyone who has participated in an activity 
contrary to the interests of, or espoused by, an effective compliance and 
ethics program; (4) periodic, effective training on, and communication 
of, the corporation’s policies and procedures throughout all levels of the 
enterprise, including, as appropriate, its agents; (5) reasonable steps 
towards achieving compliance, including monitoring and auditing 
activity to detect misconduct, periodic assessment of risks and the 
program’s efficacy and implementation of a system to report suspected 
or actual wrongdoing without fear of retaliation; (6) consistent 
enforcement of compliance standards and disciplinary mechanisms; and 
(7) reasonable steps to respond to and prevent similar wrongdoing in the 
future, including program modifications.53 
Part 8A of the Organizational Guidelines covers their application 
requiring first a determination under Part B of the “requirements and 
options relating to restitution, remedial orders, community service, and 
notice to victims,”54 before addressing the imposition of a fine,55 and 
then an evaluation under Parts D and E, respectively, of the 
“requirements and options relating to probation”56 and “special 
assessments, forfeitures, and costs.”57 
Part B provides for restitution, remediation, community service and 
notice to victims, as appropriate under the facts of the case. Remedial 
orders “may require the organization to remedy the harm caused by the 
                                                                                                                 
 53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, § 8B2.1(b)(1)-(7), 
introductory cmt; see DESIO, supra note 49. As discussed infra § I.A.2.c.1, these 
components differ slightly from guidance promulgated by the OIG. In particular, the 
OIG, as part of its “seven elements” of an effective compliance program, advocates the 
institution of a hotline for reporting anonymously suspected instances of non-
compliance, but is silent as to efforts to avoid delegating authority for the compliance 
program to individuals who exhibit a propensity toward unethical, or non-compliant or 
illegal conduct. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(1)-(7) 
(Nov. 1, 2010) with, e.g., Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23732-33 (May 5, 2003). 
 54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2(a) (Nov. 1, 2010). 
 55. Id. § 8A1.2(b). 
 56. Id. § 8A1.2(c). 
 57. Id. § 8A1.2(d). 
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offense and to eliminate or reduce the risk that the instant offense will 
cause future harm.”58 As the commentary to this subpart explains, such 
orders may require “corrective action by the organization” in order to 
“prevent future injury from the instant offense.”59 In some cases, a 
judicial mandate may not be necessary, and should, instead, issue from 
an appropriate governmental regulatory agency and be “coordinated 
with any administrative or civil actions taken by the appropriate 
governmental regulatory agency.”60 This case-specific flexibility 
provides the foundation for sentences requiring, among other things, the 
prompt development of an effective compliance and ethics program, if 
one was not in place at the time of the offense.61 
Part B also creates a framework for the assessment of an existing 
compliance and ethics program, or, if one was not in place at the time of 
the offense, guidance for the creation and adoption of one.62 Credit in 
the determination of an organization’s culpability score is available only 
if the enterprise did not “unreasonably delay[] reporting the offense to 
appropriate governmental authorities.”63 Likewise, the credit will not be 
given if “high-level personnel . . . participated in, condoned, or [were] 
willfully ignorant of the offense.”64 If an effective compliance and ethics 
program did not exist at the time of the offense, the Guidelines 
recommend the implementation of one as a condition of probation.65 The 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. § 8B1.2(a). 
 59. Id. § 8B1.2 cmt. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. § 8D1.4(b)(1). 
 62. See generally id. § 8B2.1. 
 63. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(2). 
 64. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3). Commentary regarding these restrictions was robust prior to 
the adoption of a related proposed amendment which became effective November 1, 
2010. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 39-41 (May 3, 
2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/201005 
03_RFP_Amendments.pdf. 
 65. Id. § 8D1.4(b)(1). Institutional integrity, sound values and an appropriate “tone 
at the top,” individual and organizational acceptance of responsibility, effective self-
policing, and transparency with key stakeholders are the tenets of any such program. To 
wit, the core components of an effective ethics and compliance program include: 
1. Appointment of a “high-level” executive to serve as the focal point and have 
operational responsibility for the organization’s compliance activities. Id. § 
8B2.1(b)(2)(A-B); 
2. Effective reporting channels to the organization’s “governing authority” or 
appropriate subgroup thereof, usually the board of directors or a committee of 
the board; 
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appointment of a corporate monitor can ensure, inter alia, that a robust 
compliance program be developed and adopted.66 
                                                                                                                 
3. Adequate resources and recognized authority throughout the organization to be 
effective. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C); 
4. Standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct that are 
widely disseminated throughout the organization and about which the 
organization’s governing authority must be knowledgeable and the 
implementation of which it must oversee. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(1)-(2); 
5. Mandatory, periodic training and the dissemination of information throughout 
the organization. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A); 
6. Monitoring and assessment to test the validity of the program’s practices and 
ability to detect misconduct. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A)-(C); 
7. Periodic evaluation of the program’s efficacy, combined with organizational 
risk assessments. Id. § 8B2.1(c); 
8. A publicized, anonymous and non-retaliatory system that allows employees to 
report and/or seek guidance confidentially with respect to suspected 
misconduct. Id. § 8B2.1 (b)(5)(A)-(C); 
9. Consistent promotion and enforcement of the ethics and compliance program in 
a way that encourages compliance and publicizes disciplinary measures for 
engaging in misconduct or failing to prevent or report misconduct. Id. § 8B2.1 
(b)(6); and 
10. Once detected, swift, responsive action to investigate and prevent recurrence of 
the misconduct.  
Id. at § 8B2.1 (b)(7). 
  While federal enforcement officials have taken the lead in developing these key 
components of an effective ethics and compliance program, a growing number of their 
state-level counterparts also have done so. See, e.g., James G. Sheehan, Lessons from 
Mandatory Compliance: Integrity Through Compliance Measurement, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.omig.state.ny.us/data/images/stories/ 
presentations/4182010_hcca.pdf; see also, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 61895 n.13 (Nov. 15, 
1999) (corporate integrity agreements “require many of the elements included in this 
compliance program guidance”); infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
  The efficacy of the organization’s compliance and ethics program, as evaluated 
in accordance with the guidance of § 8B2.1, affects the determination of the 
organization’s culpability under § 8C2.5 and, therefore, the fine to be levied, if any. 
Among others, key factors that influence the amount of the fine are whether the 
organization self-reported the offense, cooperated in the investigation or accepted 
responsibility, all hallmarks of a compliant and ethical culture. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (b)-(g) (Nov. 1, 2010). 
 66. Probation orders may also require periodic reports, regular or unannounced 
inspections of books and records or business operations, as well as interviews of 
knowledgeable individuals, conducted by a probation officer or an appointed expert 
whose fees must be paid by the corporation. Id. §§ 8D1.1(a)(1)-(2), 8D1.4(b)(3). 
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In April 2010, the Sentencing Commission promulgated 
amendments to the Organizational Guidelines and proposed them to 
Congress; they became effective on November 1, 2010.67 Aside from 
technical modifications, the amendments clarify the guidance under        
§ 8B2.1.68 In addition to taking reasonable steps to remediate the 
criminal conduct, the current Guidelines call on organizations to 
undertake measures that deter and prevent the recurrence of known 
misconduct.69 Companies and firms, in short, are expected to evaluate 
periodically their compliance and ethics programs to ensure efficacy, 
through risk assessments and validation exercises,70 which may reveal 
weaknesses or shortcomings that need to be addressed. The Guidelines 
suggest that an organization “may . . . use . . . an outside professional 
advisor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of any 
modifications.”71 After public comment, the Sentencing Commission 
retracted its proposal for the retention of a corporate monitor as an 
appropriate remediation step, opting instead to provide guidance that 
reasonable corrective efforts may include, among other actions, enlisting 
the services of an advisor to identify weaknesses in an organization’s 
compliance and ethics program and assist in the implementation of 
solutions to fortify such a program.72 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at app. C, amend. 744. 
 68. The amendments provide meaningful guidance as to what constitutes a 
reasonable response to detected criminal conduct as required in subsection (b)(7), and 
revise § 8C2.5 (Culpability Score) to increase the availability of the sentencing credit 
for having an effective compliance and ethics program in place. See PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 31. 
 69. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (Nov. 1, 2010). 
 70. Id. § 8B2.1(c). 
 71. See id. § 8B2.1(b)(7), cmt. 6.; see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 64, § 8B2.1 app. n.6. As scholars have observed, 
there exists a tension between the prerogatives of the organization and the desired 
behavior, emanating from the requirement of self-reporting undetected offenses in order 
for the organization to avail itself of the culpability score credit. The Sentencing 
Commission has incorporated the recommended conditions of probation requiring the 
development, court approval, implementation, publication, reporting and testing of a 
compliance and ethics program described in former § 8D1.4(c) into the revised             
§ 8D1.4(b). Still operative is the requirement that the periodic reports, called for now 
under the proposed § 8D1.4(b)(3), be shared with “any governmental regulatory body 
that oversees conduct of the organization relating to the instant offense.” 
 72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8B2.1(b)(7), cmt. 6. (Nov. 1, 2010); 
see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 64,        
§ 8B2.1 app. n.6; see also Swenson & Murphy, supra note 52, at 4. 
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The Sentencing Commission considered comments from, among 
others, the Practitioners Advisory Group (the “PAG”) and Association 
of Corporate Counsel, before declining to include an explicit reference 
to corporate monitors in the application notes to § 8B2.1(b)(7).73 
Practitioners and in-house counsel expressed concerns regarding the 
potential costs to a corporation, the inability to constrain the monitor’s 
scope of work74 and the presumption that would arise from an explicit 
reference to monitors in all resolutions of corporate investigations (even 
when conduct is detected that does not warrant prosecution).75 They also 
argued that corporations and probation departments can, in many cases, 
effectively remediate the circumstances that led to the criminal conduct 
at issue.76 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Testimony of David Debold, Chair, Practitioners Advisory Grp. (the 
“PAG”), before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2
0100317/Debold%20_PAG_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Debold Testimony]; Testimony 
of Susan Hackett, Assoc. of Corporate Counsel, before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 
(Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs 
/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100317/Hackett_ACC_Testimony.pdf [hereinfter 
Hackett Testimony]. The Ethics and Compliance Officers Association joined the 
recommendation against specific mention of monitors in the proposed Guidelines, 
favoring language describing an “independent, qualified, third party” as evincing a 
voluntary decision to “engage an independent verifier” over what it perceived to be “a 
court-ordered mandate to hire a monitor.” Testimony of Tim C. Mazur, Chief Operating 
Officer of the Ethics and Compliance Officer Assoc., before the U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ 
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100317/Mazur_testimony.pdf.  
  The Sentencing Commission retreated from proposed language that would have 
suggested that organizations engage an “independent monitor,” opting instead to 
suggest the retention of an “outside professional” to assess and advise with respect to 
corporate compliance functions. Although the corporate community resisted the 
initially proposed “monitor” language, some commentators attach little significance to 
the decision to replace “monitor” with reference to an unspecified, outside expert. See 
Swenson & Murphy, supra note 52, at 4. 
 74. Debold Testimony, supra note 73 at 2. PAG suggested instead a requirement 
that the company pay an expert to assist the probation department in its supervision of 
the company’s compliance with the terms of probation. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. The Association of Corporate Counsel agreed with PAG’s comments and 
recommendation to remove what it termed the “monitor option,” noting its fear that 
judges would take the inclusion of the reference to monitors as a best practice that 
should be routinely considered, “rather than the nuclear option that most folks who’ve 
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 ii. DOJ Guidance 
The United States Attorneys’ Manual (the “USAM”) provides 
internal guidance on a broad array of topics to United States Attorneys, 
Assistant United States Attorneys and DOJ prosecutors.77 Among other 
things, the USAM provides parameters for exercising prosecutorial 
discretion in resolving investigations involving corporate targets.78 To 
amplify and clarify this guidance, the Department has also issued a 
series of memoranda over the past decade. Beginning in June 1999 with 
a memorandum entitled The Federal Prosecution of Corporations, by 
then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder (the “Holder 
Memorandum”),79 and continuing most recently with the issuance of a 
memorandum by Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip in August 2008 
(the “Filip Memorandum”),80 a total of four memoranda have enunciated 
principles for deciding whether to investigate or charge business 
organizations, and the appropriateness of available alternatives to 
prosecution.81 This guidance seeks to inject consistency and a certain 
degree of fairness into the pursuit and resolution of corporate criminal 
investigations and promotes the Department’s goals of punishing, 
deterring, and remediating such violations.82 
                                                                                                                 
ever worked in a monitor situation perceive it to be.” Hackett Testimony, supra note 73, 
at 3. 
 77. USAM, 1-1.100. The USAM is a comprehensive resource tool that preempts 
DOJ statements, except those of the Attorney General. USAM, 1-1.200. 
 78. See, e.g., USAM 9-16.325; USAM 9-27.600-.750; USAM 9-28.100, et seq. 
 79. “Federal Prosecution of Corporations” Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., 
Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 
1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/ 
charging-corps.PDF [hereinafter Holder Memorandum]. 
 80. “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” Memorandum 
from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components 
and United States Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/ 
readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memorandum]. Unlike its 
predecessor memoranda, the Filip Memorandum was incorporated directly into the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual as USAM 9-28.100, et seq. Accordingly, throughout 
the remainder of this article, citations to the Filip Memorandum are expressed as 
citations to the pertinent sections of USAM 9-28.100, et seq. 
 81. Department officials have issued related guidance, discussed infra § II.A.2.a.3, 
concerning the criteria for the selection and use of monitors in resolution agreements. 
 82. See Breuer Testimony, supra note 27 (discussing generally the DOJ’s goals of 
deterrence and rehabilitation with respect to corporate misconduct and noting that as 
part of a resolution agreement, the DOJ may require that corporations retain 
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A. Corporate Resolution Mechanisms 
1. Historical Overview 
As demonstrated in several cases, most notably, the prosecution of 
Arthur Andersen LLP by the DOJ Criminal Division’s Enron Task 
Force, the decision to charge a business organization with criminal 
violations can have profound and irreparable adverse consequences.83 A 
company or firm in a highly regulated industry can be thrust into a 
tailspin resulting in its demise by mandatory or permissive exclusions 
from publicly-funded programs or revocation or rescission of licenses or 
contracts, or through disqualification from future procurements. In the 
wake of a criminal conviction, moreover, an organization competing in 
any sector will face a very real prospect of loss of customers and key 
employees. Hence, the decision to charge business organizations with 
criminal misconduct is among the most complex determinations a 
prosecutor may face. 
While the prosecution of business organizations in the United 
States dates back to 1909,84 the Holder Memorandum was the first 
formal guidance issued by the DOJ. It set forth certain considerations or 
principles regarding a decision to criminally charge a business 
organization:85 
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk 
of harm to the public; 
2. the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation; 
3. the corporation’s history of similar conduct; 
                                                                                                                 
“independent compliance monitors in appropriate cases”). See also Prepared remarks to 
Compliance Week 2010 – 5th Annual Conference for Corporate Financial, Legal, Risk, 
Audit & Compliance Officers (May 26, 2010) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant 
Attorney Gen.). 
 83. See, e.g., P.J. Meitle, Who’s the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate 
America, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 2, 4-5 (2007); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of 
Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 52-53 (2007); F. 
Joseph Warin, Peter E. Jaffe, The Deferred Prosecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest 
Proposal for Reform, 19 Andrews Litigation Rep. 1 (Sept. 2005); Greenblum, supra 
note 6, at 1865-69. 
 84. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 85. Holder Memorandum, supra note 79. 
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4. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation; 
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance 
program; 
6. the corporation’s remedial actions; 
7. the collateral consequences, including disproportionate 
harm to shareholders and others; and 
8. the adequacy of non-criminal remedies.86 
These principles and supporting commentary have evolved through 
a series of memoranda drafted by successive administrations, 
culminating in the Filip Memorandum.87 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See id. at 2-3. 
 87. Briefly, then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued a 
superseding memorandum on January 20, 2003. Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations, Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney 
General, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 
2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. The Thompson 
Memorandum added another consideration to the Holder Memorandum: the adequacy 
of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the organization’s malfeasance. See 
Thompson Memorandum, at 3. It also observed that in evaluating the adequacy of the 
corporation’s cooperation in the investigation, the prosecutor could consider whether 
the corporation was willing to waive the attorney-client and work product privilege. See 
Thompson Memorandum, at 5. The suggestion that a corporation may waive its 
attorney-client and work product privileges in order to avoid indictment proved to be 
controversial. Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go 
Far Enough?, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Sept. 11, 2008); see also United States. v. Stein, 
435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
  On December 12, 2006 then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty issued 
yet another revision of the “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations” that superseded the Thompson Memorandum. Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy 
Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys 
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/ 
mcnulty_memo.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. 
  The McNulty Memorandum attempted to limit a prosecutor’s ability to request 
a waiver of the corporation’s attorney-client or work product privileges and removed 
the waiver of these protections from the list of factors that U.S. Attorneys should 
consider when deciding whether to charge an organization. Compare Thompson 
Memorandum, Principle II, Factor No. 4 with McNulty Memorandum, Principle III, 
Factor No. 4. The McNulty Memorandum also modified one of the previously 
articulated principles; specifically, it provided that a prosecutor should only consider 
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The Filip Memorandum acknowledges, but rejects, the popular 
understanding that cooperation impliedly meant waiving the 
corporation’s attorney-client privilege or attorney work product 
protection.88 Instead, it clarifies that the mitigating cooperation credit 
central to the prosecutive analysis, which ranges in outcome along a 
spectrum from prosecution to declining prosecution, turns on a target 
corporation’s willingness to disclose facts relevant to the government’s 
inquiry.89 This disclosure, in turn, entails consideration of whether the 
corporation decides to pay the legal fees of its officers or employees 
who are implicated in the government’s investigation or whether it 
participates in a joint defense agreement.90 In this vein, the Filip 
Memorandum acknowledges the utility of NPAs and deferred 
prosecution agreements DPAs as a middle ground that balances the 
collateral consequences of prosecuting corporations—harm to innocent 
third parties (employees, vendors and shareholders who knew nothing of 
the alleged misconduct), harm to the communities in which the 
corporation operates, and risk to economic markets, to name but a few—
against the likelihood of obtaining restitution, rehabilitating the 
corporation and engendering respect for the law and trust and 
confidence in enforcement authorities. At the same time, NPAs and 
DPAs preserve the government’s ability to prosecute noncompliant 
corporations that, nonetheless, materially breach the resolution 
agreement.91 
2. NPAs 
As its name suggests, a NPA memorializes the government’s 
agreement not to prosecute a target corporation for violations of federal 
                                                                                                                 
pre-existing compliance programs in deciding whether to bring criminal charges against 
a corporation. 
 88. Filip Memorandum, supra note 80. 
 89. Id. While significant for its stance against compulsory waiver, some criticize 
that the Filip Memorandum does not go far enough, appearing to suggest grades of 
protected information and forbidding requests for “core” privileged material, while 
saying nothing of “non-core” privileged materials, which may remain subject to 
prosecutors’ requests. See Stein & Levine, supra note 87. 
 90. See USAM 9-28.730 n.6. 
 91. See id. at 9-28.1000 
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law.92A NPA is an appropriate resolution mechanism only when other 
means of obtaining cooperation are unavailable or would be ineffective, 
and the company’s cooperation is needed to advance the public’s 
interest.93 Before offering a business organization a NPA, prosecutors 
are expected to consider the significance of the investigation or 
prosecution to a law enforcement program, the value and history of the 
company’s cooperation to the investigation or prosecution, and the 
organization’s culpability and criminal record.94 The prosecutor’s 
supervisor must approve a NPA.95 Multi-district NPAs require the 
approval of each implicated USAO.96 
NPAs must be drafted carefully and with particularity, limiting 
their scope to the specific offenses committed.97 A properly drafted NPA 
“leaves no doubt as to the obligations of the parties to the agreement.”98 
3. DPAs 
Akin to NPAs, DPAs memorialize the government’s agreement to 
defer prosecution of a defendant for a certain temporal period, 
contingent on the corporate defendant’s fulfillment of a litany of 
commitments and obligations.99 In contrast to a NPA, a DPA is 
predicated on a charging document—typically a Criminal 
Information100—and often an uncontested Statement of Facts, both of 
which are filed with the court.101 The Statement of Facts is sufficiently 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See USAM 9-27.600(A) and (B)(1)(d). Thompson Memorandum, supra note 
87, at 5. Unlike DPAs, NPAs are not predicated upon the filing of a formal charging 
document and the court is not involved. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, 
Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t. Components, 
U.S. Attorneys 1 n. 2 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-
useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter Morford Memorandum]. 
 93. See USAM 9-27.600(B)(2)-(4). 
 94. See id. at 9-27.620(A), 9-27.620 (B)(3), 9-28-1000(B). 
 95. Id. at 9-27.600(B)(4). 
 96. Id. at 9-27.641(A). 
 97. See id. at 9-27.630(A)(1)-(2). 
 98. Id. at 9-27.650 (B). 
 99. The Speedy Trial Act permits courts to defer prosecutions pursuant to written 
agreements between the government and the defendant, as a means of allowing the 
defendant to exhibit conduct that would excuse the need for prosecution. 18 U.S.C.       
§ 3161(h)(2) (2006). 
 100. A Criminal Information is filed by the United States Attorney upon a waiver of 
a target’s right to be indicted by a Grand Jury. 
 101. Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1 n.2. 
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detailed to demonstrate both that the agreement is beneficial and that the 
defendant’s guilt is readily provable. The corporation usually agrees not 
to make any public statement that contradicts, or is inconsistent with, the 
Statement of Facts. 
The prosecution of corporate crimes has long been a high priority 
for the Department.102 When warranted, it promotes “critical public 
interests,” such as protecting the integrity of the marketplace, market 
participants and citizens from misconduct and safeguarding the 
environment, to name a few.103 The DOJ advises its attorneys to 
consider the shared and common interests of the government and private 
businesses. In consideration of these interests, attorneys should conduct 
themselves with professionalism, civility and diligence to achieve their 
mission and engender the public trust.104 In this regard, the Department 
views its role as effectuating positive changes in corporate culture and 
detecting, remedying and preventing serious crimes.105 
The artificial nature of a corporation is irrelevant in determining 
whether it should be prosecuted.106 NPAs and DPAs are now well-
accepted mechanisms for resolving allegations of criminal misconduct 
short of convictions.107 They provide a “middle ground between 
declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”108 
The use of NPAs and DPAs is in line with the prosecutor’s broad 
discretion to determine “when, whom, how, and even whether to 
prosecute [organizations] for violations of federal criminal law.”109 
These decisions are applied consistently with the guidance set out in the 
Holder Memorandum and in the Filip Memorandum.110 The policy 
considerations of an administrative agency affected by the company’s 
misconduct may also be relevant. These may include, in certain 
circumstances, the corporation’s pre-indictment conduct, e.g., voluntary 
disclosure, cooperation, remediation or restitution,111 as well as whether 
the organization faces other regulatory sanctions based on the same 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See USAM 9-28.100. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id; cf. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 87, at 2. 
 105. See USAM 9-28.200(A). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 9-28.200 (B). 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 9-28.300(B). 
 110. Id. at 9-28.300(A); see also id. at 9-28.400-28.1100. 
 111. See id. at 9-28.400(B). 
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operative facts, such as suspension or debarment from participating in a 
federal program.112 
Perhaps the most significant of these considerations is the 
corporation’s cooperation. As the USAM recognizes: 
[C]ooperation can be a favorable course for both the government and 
the corporation. Cooperation benefits the government—and 
ultimately shareholders, employees, and other often blameless 
victims—by allowing prosecutors and federal agents, for example, to 
avoid protracted delays, which compromise their ability to quickly 
uncover and address the full extent of widespread corporate crimes. 
With cooperation by the corporation, the government may be able to 
reduce tangible losses, limit damage to reputation, and preserve 
assets for restitution. At the same time, cooperation may benefit the 
corporation by enabling the government to focus its investigative 
resources in a manner that will not unduly disrupt the corporation’s 
legitimate business operations. In addition, and critically, 
cooperation may benefit the corporation by presenting it with the 
opportunity to earn credit for its efforts.113 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. at 9-28.1000. 
 113. Id. at 9-28.700(B). The DOJ does not require waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege or attorney work product protection as a condition or factor necessary for a 
corporation to be viewed as cooperative, although this was not always the case. See id. 
at 9-28.710. 
  Over the past decade, many commentators and scholars have criticized the 
Department, suggesting that its policies, either in practice or perception, wittingly or 
not, have been developed and applied in such a way to coerce business organizations 
into waiving evidentiary protections such as the attorney-client privilege or attorney 
work product doctrine. Id.; see also George A. Stamboulidis & Lauren J. Resnick, Dos 
and Don’ts for Managing a Monitor: Worried That a Compliance Issue May Result in a 
Government-Imposed Monitor in Your Midst? Be Proactive to Help . . ., 33 DIRS. & 
BDS. 1, 36, Sept. 22, 2008; John Pacenti, Wielding Sticks When Carrots Would Do, 
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. Vol. 82, Issue 164 (Feb. 4, 2008); Earl J. Silbert and Demme 
Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate 
Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225 (2006); Mary 
Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, Practicing Law 
Institute, 1517 PLI Corp. 815, 818 (Nov. 2005); David B. Oitofsky, 
Monitor/Examiner’s Role Under Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 234 N.Y.L.J. 4, 
col. 4, Sept. 14, 2005. Affirming the sanctity of the evidentiary privileges in question, 
the DOJ has now made clear that what is needed to advance the Department’s mission 
is not a waiver of its protections, but the factual predicate of the misconduct under 
investigation, which the organization is often in a unique position to know. USAM 9-
28.710. At bottom, “prosecutors should not ask for such waivers and are directed not to 
2012] ANSWERING TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY 325 
 
  
Cooperation does not guarantee any particular level of leniency.114 
However, certain government agencies and departments, such as the 
SEC and the EPA “have formal voluntary disclosure programs in which 
self-reporting, coupled with remediation and additional criteria, may 
qualify the corporation for amnesty or reduced sanctions.”115 The DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division, for instance, extends amnesty only to the first 
corporation to voluntarily report unlawful price-fixing.116 
The organization’s operational realities dictate the scope of the 
resolution agreement, which in the case of national or multi-national 
organizations, requires multi-district approval and perhaps the approval, 
or assistance and cooperation, of foreign enforcement officials.117 Key 
components of the resolution agreement include terms designed to 
punish and deter the recurrence of the offense, rehabilitate the 
organization and ensure compliance with the agreement.118 To these 
ends, the company typically agrees to: 
 fully cooperate, including the timely disclosure of relevant 
facts;119 
 comply with all provisions of the NPA/DPA and all statutes and 
regulations applying to the corporation’s business; 
 pay a fine; 
 establish/continue a comprehensive compliance program;120 
 draft and adopt certain policies and procedures; 
 in the case of a DPA, not contradict an agreed upon Statement of 
Facts; 
 waive defenses; and 
 retain a monitor.121 
                                                                                                                 
do so. The critical factor is whether the corporation has provided the facts about the 
events, as explained further herein.” Id. 
  “Accordingly, a corporation should receive the same credit for disclosing facts 
contained in materials that are not protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney 
work product as it would for disclosing identical facts contained in materials that are so 
protected.” USAM 9-28.720. 
 114. Id. at 9-28.740. 
 115. See id. at 9-28.750; see also infra §§ (II)(A)(2)(b) & (d). 
 116. USAM 9-28.750; cf. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 87, Principle VI; 
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 87, Principle VII. 
 117. USAM 9-28.1000 (B) n.8. 
 118. See id. at 9-28.1300 (A); Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1 n.2. 
 119. See USAM 9-28.720. 
 120. See id. at 9-28.800. 
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B. The Charter and Selection of a Monitor 
Over the past decade, with varying degrees of success, the DOJ and 
the companies involved have grappled with the challenges of defining 
and adhering to the scope and duration of a monitor’s responsibilities. 
Additional quandries have included creating a mechanism for resolving 
disagreements between a monitor and an organization, and ensuring that 
the selection process is free of conflicts of interest, instills public 
confidence and results in the retention of a monitor who is both qualified 
and well-respected. Partly in response to some high profile monitorships 
involving perceived conflicts of interest, “scope creep” and excessive 
fees, on March 7, 2008, the DOJ, through the Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General, released a Memorandum to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys authored by then-Acting 
Deputy Attorney General Craig S. Morford (the “Morford 
Memorandum”) to “present a series of principles for drafting provisions 
pertaining to the use of monitors in connection with deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements” with business 
organizations.122 The Morford Memorandum sets forth the following 
guiding principles for the DOJ and U.S. Attorneys to follow in crafting 
monitorships and selecting monitors: 
1. prior to selection, the government and company should 
address the qualifications desired of a monitor, in light of 
the circumstances, in order to select someone who is highly 
qualified, well respected and free of conflicts of interest and 
to instill public confidence in the selection process;123 
2. the monitor must be independent; she is neither an 
employee of the organization nor of the government;124 
3. the primary charge of the monitor should be to “assess and 
monitor a corporation’s compliance” with the terms of the 
NPA or DPA that are “specifically designed to address and 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp., 
Inc., et al., No. 4:08-cr-00287, (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Willbros Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement]; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Technip 
S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010) [hereinafter Technip Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement]. 
 122. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 2. 
 123. Id. at Principle 1. 
 124. Id. at Principle 2. 
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reduce the risk of recurrence of the corporation’s 
misconduct;”125 
4. in furtherance of this charge, the monitor needs to 
“understand the full scope of the corporation’s 
misconduct,” but should constrain her work and the 
discharge of her responsibilities accordingly;126 
5. provide periodic reports assessing the corporation’s 
compliance with the terms of the DPA and the monitor’s 
recommendations;127 
6. require the monitor to identify and report new or previously 
undisclosed misconduct of the corporation;128 
7. the duration of the DPA and the monitorship should be 
tailored to the specific problems of the corporation to be 
monitored;129 and 
8. the DPA should provide for extensions or early 
terminations of the monitorship under appropriate 
circumstances.130 
On May 25, 2010, the DOJ, through then-Acting Deputy Attorney 
General Gary G. Grindler, issued a new Memorandum to Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys (the “Grindler 
Memorandum”) that supplemented the Morford principles.131 The 
Grindler Memorandum adds an additional element favoring the 
inclusion of a provision in resolution agreements involving the 
appointment of a monitor that clarifies the role the DOJ may play in 
resolving disputes between the corporation and the monitor.132 The 
Grindler Memorandum observes that the Department’s role in resolving 
these disputes should be limited to “questions relating to whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at Principle 3. 
 126. Id. at Principle 4. 
 127. Id. at Principle 5. 
 128. Id. at Principle 7. 
 129. Id. at Principle 8. 
 130. Id. at Principle 9. 
 131. Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General, 
“Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations,” § I, (May 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00166.htm 
[hereinafter Grindler Memorandum]. 
 132. Id. 
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company has complied with the terms of the agreement.”133 It includes 
two model provisions for reference by federal prosecutors.134 
iii. Case Studies 
As previously noted, between 1993 and 2009, the DOJ negotiated 
over 140 corporate NPAs and DPAs.135 As the Department’s guidance 
has evolved during that time, so too have the terms of the resolution 
agreements.136 Two recent DPAs entered in the Southern District of 
Texas are illustrative of current practices in federal corporate 
investigations. 
A. United States v. Willbros Group, Inc. 
An epicenter of the energy sector in the United States, the Southern 
District of Texas is home to a number of multi-national oil and gas 
corporations and the District’s prosecutors and enforcement officials 
have developed a heightened sensitivity to compliance with the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended.137 The FCPA contains, 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. § II. 
 134. An organization’s performance obligations under the terms of a resolution 
agreement may also implicate the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
doctrine in unique ways that test the bounds of the organizations’ protections against 
the compelled disclosure of sensitive information. The USAM cautions prosecutors that 
organizations are encouraged to report perceived violations of these well-settled 
protections, which the Department may separately investigate and, where appropriate, 
discipline its attorneys. See USAM 9-28.760. 
 135. See Corporate Crime: Preliminary Observations on DOJ’s Use and Oversight 
of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice, Government Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d09636t.pdf. 
 136. For in depth discussions of key features of select DPAs, see, e.g., Matt Senko, 
Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 163 (2009); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1744-55; Bohrer & 
Trencher, supra note 35, at 1492-94, 1500-02; Warin & Jaffe, supra note 83; 
Greenblum, supra note 6, at 1871-80, 89-94. 
 137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2006). Since 1998, the DOJ increasingly has used NPAs 
and DPAs to resolve corporate violations of the FCPA. See Response of the United 
States Questions Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Appendix B – 
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among other elements, anti-bribery provisions designed to combat 
corrupt payments to foreign officials in exchange for preferential 
treatment in business dealings.138 
In the case of Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc. 
(collectively, “Willbros”), the DOJ brought charges, between 2006 and 
2008, against Willbros, a provider of construction and engineering-
related services to the oil and gas industry, and three of its former 
executives, for violating the FCPA.139 Following a series of 
investigations, the DOJ found Willbros to be in violation of FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions in relation to separate transactions between the 
Willbros, Nigerian government officials and officials of Ecuador’s state-
run petroleum company involving contracts in connection with the 
replacement of pipelines and other projects in those countries.140 In 
addition, Willbros was found to have engaged in a tax fraud scheme in 
Bolivia, through which the Company wired funds to fraudulently claim 
Bolivian state tax credits. 141 
Executed in May 2008, the DPA negotiated with Willbros Group, 
Inc. and Willbros International, Inc. emphasized Willbros’ voluntary 
and full cooperation throughout the inquiry.142 Most notably, it 
highlighted the internal investigation conducted by the Audit Committee 
of the Board of Directors, the voluntary disclosure of the findings, and 
conclusions thereof, and the companies’ limited waiver of the attorney-
client privilege as to the DOJ.143 As part of the negotiated resolution, 
Willbros agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $22 million,144 continue its 
implementation of a corporate compliance and ethics program, refine its 
internal controls and policies to enhance FCPA compliance and engage 
                                                                                                                 
Chart 5, “Sanctions Imposed Upon Legal Persons for FCPA Violations Since 1998” 
(May 3, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-appx-b.pdf. 
 138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1. 
 139. See Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment A, 
Statement of Facts; Press Release, Department of Justice, Former Willbros International 
Consultant Pleads Guilty to $6 Million Foreign Bribery Scheme (Nov. 12, 2009) (on 
file with author), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
conewsstory&tkr=WG:US&sid=aNgHsMsp4qmI. 
 140. See Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment A, 
Statement of Facts. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. ¶ 5. 
 143. Id. ¶¶ 5(a)-(e). 
 144. Id. ¶ 7. 
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a corporate monitor.145 Among other things, the DPA described the 
mechanism by which the company would propose monitor candidates 
for the DOJ’s acceptance, the required qualifications of the monitor and 
the monitor’s term of engagement.146 Moreover, the DPA incorporated, 
by reference, Attachment D, which explained “the Monitor’s duties and 
authority, and the obligations of [the company] with respect to the 
Monitor and the Department.”147 The document detailing the scope of 
the Monitor’s authority included a mechanism by which the company 
could withhold from the Monitor documents and information on the 
grounds of evidentiary protections, such as the attorney-client privilege 
or attorney work product doctrine, with prompt notice to the Monitor 
and the DOJ.148 The DPA, however, allowed the DOJ to consider the 
company’s decision to withhold such information in determining 
whether it had fully cooperated with the Department under the 
agreement.149 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 
 147. Id. ¶ 13. Under the Willbros DPA, the monitor’s term was three years, which 
the DOJ could extend for an additional one-year period. See Willbros Defered 
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment D, ¶¶ 1, 3. Willbros was 
empowered to propose monitor candidates for the DOJ’s approval. The Monitor 
candidates had to have FCPA expertise; experience designing and implementing 
compliance programs and policies and procedures; the ability to access and deploy 
resources as necessary and appropriate to discharge her duties; and independence from 
Willbros. Id. ¶ 1(a)-(d). The monitor was required to issue three reports to the DOJ after 
preparing in advance of each report a workplan that was subject to comment from both 
Willbros and the DOJ. Id. ¶ 7(e). The initial report was required to be filed within 120 
days of the monitor’s retention, and the two follow-up reports were to be issued at one 
year intervals thereafter. The reports were to be served contemporaneously on the DOJ 
and Willbros. Id. Within sixty days of receipt of the monitor’s report, Willbros was 
required to object in writing to any of the monitor’s recommendations it found 
impracticable with an alternative proposal or, within 120 days, adopt and implement the 
monitor’s recommendations. Id. ¶ 7(e)(iii). To the extent Willbros disagreed with the 
monitor’s recommendation, the Department would consider its written response and 
alternative proposal in determining whether Willbros had fully complied with the terms 
of the DPA. Id. If the monitor uncovered a suspected or actual violation of law, the 
DPA empowered her to report the matter to Willbros’ General Counsel, Audit 
Committee and its outside counsel for investigation or, if warranted, directly to the 
DOJ. Id. ¶ 9. If the monitor reported such a matter to the company, Willbros was, in 
turn, required to disclose the matter to the Department within ten days. Id. 
 148. Id. ¶ 6(b). 
 149. Id. ¶ 6(a). 
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B. United States v. Technip S.A. 
Similarly, between 2009 and 2010 the DOJ charged Technip, S.A. 
(“Technip”), a French company that provides engineering, procurement 
and construction services to the oil and gas industry, and several of its 
senior level employees, with violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions; the charges stemmed from the Company’s payment of bribes 
to Nigerian officials to obtain contracts for the design and development 
of a liquefied natural gas plant.150 On June 28, 2010, the Criminal 
Division, Fraud Section of the DOJ resolved two counts of alleged 
violations of the FCPA involving Technip.151 The charges against 
Technip were premised on its purported participation in a conspiracy by 
which a Technip-affiliated joint venture, of which it was a part, was 
claimed to have bribed high-level foreign officials in an effort to secure 
engineering contracts in connection with the development of a liquefied 
natural gas plant in Nigeria.152 
In broad strokes, the DPA required Technip’s continued 
cooperation with the Government, payment of a monetary penalty of 
$240 million and the engagement of a corporate monitor with an initial 
two-year and seven day term, subject to an extension of up to one 
year.153 The DPA recognized that Technip had “fully cooperated in the 
investigation and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Technip Deffered Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment A, 
Statement of Facts. 
 151. Id. at attachment A, ¶ 1. While the French government was not a party to the 
agreement, the DPA is notable for its requirement that the monitor review and report on 
Tecnhip’s compliance with both American and French anti-corruption laws and report 
suspected or actual violations to the appropriate sovereign authority. Just as sovereign 
powers are increasingly cooperating in the investigation and resolution of anti-
corruption laws, domestically, federal and state governments are collaborating in 
corporate investigations. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. 
WellCare Health Plans, Inc., No. 8:09-cr-00203, (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2009), http://www. 
wellcare.com/WCAssets/corporate/assets/00_dpa_complete.pdf. (DPA between the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida, the Florida Attorney 
General’s Office and Wellcare Health Plans Inc., and its Affiliates and Subsidiaries). 
One of the authors of this article, Mr. O’Neil, was appointed Senior Vice President, 
General Counsel and Secretary of WellCare in April 2008, after the investigation of the 
Company became public. He executed the DPA on behalf of WellCare and was later 
named Executive Vice Chairman. 
 152. Id. ¶¶ 2-22. 
 153. See Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, ¶¶ 3,11. 
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acceptance of responsibility for criminal conduct,” for which it received 
a two-point credit in the calculation of its culpability score.154 It also 
described Technip’s obligation to continue its implementation and 
refinement of a corporate compliance and ethics program, as well as to 
conduct a review of its internal controls, policies and procedures in an 
effort to bolster FCPA compliance.155 
To assist the company with these obligations, the DPA included a 
document detailing the mechanism by which the Company would 
propose and retain the monitor, as well as the scope of the monitor’s 
duties.156 The DPA was required to be attached to and incorporated into 
the retention agreement between Technip and the Monitor.157 
Furthermore, the “parties agree[d] that the Monitor is an independent 
third-party, not an employee or agent of [Technip] or the Department, 
and that no attorney-client relationship shall be formed between Technip 
and the Monitor.”158 The DPA described the process and frequency by 
which the Monitor would conduct reviews and issue reports,159 required 
the Monitor to develop a work plan subject to the parties’ review and 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Id. ¶ 6(C). 
 155. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
 156. Id. ¶ 10. The monitor’s term was two years. Id. at Attachment D ¶ 2. 
 157. Id. ¶ 4. 
 158. Id. ¶ 5(a). 
 159. Id. ¶¶ 6-11. In advance of each report, the Monitor was required to submit a 
workplan that was subject to review and comment by Technip and the Department, but 
the Monitor was empowered to resolve any disagreement with Technip or the 
Department relating to the workplan. Id. ¶ 6. The Monitor’s first report was due within 
120 days of her engagement, and it was to be served simultaneously on Technip and the 
Department. Id. ¶ 7. The Monitor was then required to issue two follow-up reports. Id. ¶ 
9. Within sixty days of receipt of one of the Monitor’s reports, Technip was required to 
object, in writing, to any recommendation it considered impracticable; if not, Technip 
was to adopt and implement the Monitor’s recommendations within 120 days of receipt 
of the report. Id. ¶ 8. In the event of a disagreement concerning one of the Monitor’s 
recommendations, Technip and the Monitor were to seek guidance from French 
authorities in an effort to resolve the dispute. Ultimately, however, the Monitor’s 
decision was binding as to whether Technip should adopt her, or an alternative, 
proposal. Id. ¶ 8. In the event the Monitor uncovered suspected or actual violations of 
law, the DPA empowered her to refer the matter to Technip’s Ethics and Compliance 
Committee, Ethics and Governance Committee and Technip’s Chairman, and 
recommend that Technip pursue an investigation. Id. ¶ 11. If Technip failed to report 
the matter to French authorities or the Department, the Monitor was empowered to do 
so. Id. 
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comment prior to commencing its work,160 and described a mechanism 
through which future violations would be referred to the company’s 
ethics and compliance committee for further investigation or reporting 
to the Government at the direction of the Monitor.161 
b. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
i. Regulatory Initiatives 
In 2002, Congress formalized the SEC’s power to seek equitable 
relief when settling securities enforcement actions. Enacted in the wake 
of a series of cataclysmic corporate scandals, SOX might be more 
appropriately referred to as “the Enron/WorldCom Response Act.”162 
While the Enron demise triggered the initiative, “it took the WorldCom 
collapse to bring it to fruition.”163 Section 305(b) of SOX amended the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) to add that “[i]n any 
action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any 
provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any 
Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or 
necessary for the benefit of investors.”164 This express legislative 
authorization buttressed long-standing statutory provisions and judicial 
decisions construing and applying them.165 Under the 1934 Act and the 
1933 Securities Act (the “1933 Act”), the Commission, through its 
Enforcement Division, was authorized to initiate civil, administrative, 
and cease-and-desist actions seeking, inter alia,166 permanent and 
temporary injunctions, money damages, and orders prohibiting 
individuals from participating in the offering of stocks.167 In connection 
with cease-and-desist orders, both the 1933 and 1934 Acts authorized 
the SEC to ensure ongoing compliance with federal securities laws: 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. ¶ 6. 
 161. Id. ¶ 11. 
 162. Harold S. Bloomenthal, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 1:1 (2010). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-204, Title III, §305(b), 116 Stat. 
745 (July 30, 2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006)). 
 165. James Fanto, Directors’ & Officers’ Liability, PLIREF-DIRLIAB § 7:5.4 at *7-
45 (2011). 
 166. 1934 Act § 21; 1933 Act § 8A. 
 167. 1934 Act § 21; 1933 Act § 8A. 
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Such order may, in addition to requiring a person to cease and desist 
from committing or causing a violation, require such person to 
comply, or to take steps to effect compliance, with such provision, 
rule, or regulation, upon such terms and conditions and within such 
time as the Commission may specify in such order. Any such order 
may, as the Commission deems appropriate, require future 
compliance or steps to effect future compliance, either permanently 
or for such period of time as the Commission may specify, with such 
provision, rule, or regulation with respect to any security, any issuer, 
or any other person.168 
Hence, long before the advent of SOX, the SEC had asserted 
authority to ensure continuing compliance with its regulations, rules and 
enforcement policies.169 
As far back as the 1960s, the SEC was imposing outside 
receiverships on corporations as part of its enforcement actions.170 At 
first, the Commission’s primary goal was to ensure the preservation of 
assets whenever fraud or waste seemed likely. Soon, however, outside 
receivers were tasked with ensuring long-term compliance with federal 
securities laws and regulations.171 In cases in which securities laws had 
been willfully violated but receivers were unnecessary, the duty to 
ensure compliance was delegated to independent directors, special 
counsel, or outside advisors appointed pursuant to settlement 
agreements.172 These individuals, often in conjunction with court-
appointed directors, served a remedial function that presaged modern-
day independent consultants and monitors. 
Against this backdrop, in 1994, a corporate monitor with an 
unprecedented mandate was appointed in the landmark Prudential 
                                                                                                                 
 168. 1933 Act § 8A(a); 1934 Act § 21C(a). 
 169. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 684-86; see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra 
note 3, at 1717 (citing BellSouth Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 45,279, 2002 WL 
47 167 (Jan. 15, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-45279; Chiquita Brands 
Int’I Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44,902, 75 SEC Docket 2308 (Oct. 3, 2001); Am. 
Bank Note Holographies, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7994, Exchange Act Release 
No. 44,563, 75 SEC Docket 912 (July 18, 2001); KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange 
Act Release No. 44,050, 74 SEC Docket 1351 (Mar. 8, 2001); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 
Exchange Act Release No. 43,761, 73 SEC Docket 2987 (Dec. 21, 2000). 
 170. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 684. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 685. 
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Securities case,173 which involved an investigation of alleged securities 
fraud arising in the sale of oil and gas limited partnerships. Prudential’s 
counsel and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District 
of New York negotiated a DPA through a series of meetings and 
letters.174 Among other things, defense counsel argued that criminal 
prosecution was unnecessary and proposed the imposition of an outside 
monitor at the company’s expense.175 The DPA reinforced the settlement 
Prudential had already reached with the SEC by requiring the company 
to “retain a mutually acceptable outside counsel within 30 days of the 
filing of this Agreement to review [Prudential’s] policies and procedures 
in order to ensure that [Prudential] has adopted all of the compliance-
related directives” mandated by the SEC.176 Thereafter, both agencies 
began requiring the appointment of independent monitors in connection 
with the resolutions of their investigations.177 With the passage of SOX, 
the SEC gained Congressional approval of the agreements first 
pioneered in Prudential Securities and implemented by courts 
repeatedly in similar cases that followed.178 
In February 2009, the Commission announced that Robert S. 
Khuzami, a former federal prosecutor who had served as the Chief of 
the Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force of the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, had been 
named the Director of the Division of Enforcement (the “Division”).179 
Under Mr. Khuzami’s leadership, the Division undertook a “rigorous 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See SEC v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2164, 1993 WL 473189, at *2-3 
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993); see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1717 (citing 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United Stales v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-2189 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994)). 
 174. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1717-18. 
 175. See Correspondence between the United States Department of Justice and 
Prudential Securities Inc. dated October 27, 1994 and October 13, 1994 (advocating for, 
and memorializing, terms of a deferred prosecution agreement), available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/prudential.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 
2011. See also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1717-18 (citing Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-2189 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 27, 1994)). 
 176. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 
No. 94-2189 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994). 
 177. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1718. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Press Release, SEC, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director of Enforcement 
(Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-31.htm. 
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self-assessment” as part of its effort to become stronger, more swift and 
strategic in its enforcement initiatives and priorities.180 Less than a year 
after his appointment, on January 13, 2010, Mr. Khuzami held a press 
conference to announce five new specialized enforcement units, along 
with an arsenal of new investigative tools, including the empowerment 
of senior staff to issue subpoenas and the introduction of cooperation 
agreements and non- and deferred prosecution agreements.181 Mr. 
Khuzami’s announcement expressed unequivocally the Division’s 
intention to create concrete, meaningful incentives for individuals or 
companies with knowledge of securities fraud or other violations to self-
report in a timely fashion and fully cooperate thereafter.182 This initiative 
appears to signal the beginning of a new phase in SEC enforcement 
efforts in which the Commission expects greater self-monitoring by 
corporations. 
In December 2010, following prompt and extensive self-reporting, 
the Commission entered into its first unilateral NPA with Carter’s Inc., a 
children’s clothing retailer.183 Carter’s Inc. discovered that a now-former 
executive had perpetrated a scheme of financial fraud against it, which 
caused the company to overstate its income for a period of five years 
preceding the agreement, while the former executive used inside 
information to exercise stock options worth more than $4 million.184 
Once the executive’s conduct was discovered, the Audit Committee of 
Carter’s Inc.’s Board of Directors, with the assistance of outside 
counsel, conducted a thorough internal investigation and promptly self-
reported its findings to the Commission, and took remedial measures 
and cooperated extensively with the Commission’s own investigation, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Robert Khuzami, Remarks at News Conference Announcing Enforcement 
Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov 
/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm [hereinafter Khuzami Speech]. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals 
and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm [hereinafter SEC Cooperation 
Initiative Press Release]; Khuzami Speech, supra note 180. 
 183. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Carter’s Executive with Fraud 
and Insider Trading SEC (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
252.htm [hereinafter SEC Charges Former Carter’s Executive]. 
 184. Complaint, SEC v. Elles, No. 1:10-cv-4118 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2010); see SEC 
Charges Former Carter’s Executive, supra note 183. 
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for which the company “received the benefits of a non-prosecution 
agreement.”185 
Continuing on this trajectory, in May 2011, the SEC executed its 
first unilateral DPA with Tenaris, S.A.186 This agreement resolved 
allegations that Tenaris had violated the FCPA by making payments to 
foreign officials and utilizing improper accounting methods from 2006 
through 2008 to secure service contracts with the government of 
Uzbekistan.187 In March 2009, a customer informed Tenaris that it had 
knowledge of improper payments by Tenaris that may have benefited 
the third party’s employees.188 In response, the Audit Committee of 
Tenaris’s Board of Directors retained outside counsel and conducted an 
internal investigation.189 Tenaris disclosed to the Commission and the 
DOJ the preliminary findings of its internal investigation, and it pledged 
to expand its investigation and share its findings with the 
Government.190 A year later, Tenaris’s counsel shared with the SEC and 
DOJ the facts learned from its world-wide, detailed internal 
investigation, which included the revelation of improper payments to 
Uzbekistani officials and accounting for the same, which enabled the 
company to secure contracts in Uzbekistan, as well as facts unrelated to 
the third-party information that gave rise to the internal investigation 
and initial disclosure to the Commission and the DOJ.191 Given the 
company’s self-disclosure to, and forthright cooperation with, the SEC, 
following an internal investigation by outside counsel to the Audit 
                                                                                                                 
 185. SEC Charges Former Carter’s Executive, supra note 179. See Non-Prosecution 
Agreement between Carter’s Inc. and the SEC, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/cooperation/2010/carters1210.pdf. 
 186. See Jaclyn Jaeger, SEC Gets into the Non-Prosecution Agreement Act, 
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 25, 2011; Non-Prosecution Agreement between Carter’s Inc. 
and the SEC, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/cooperation/2010 
/carters1210.pdf. 
 187. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Tenaris, S.A. and the SEC, SEC 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. ¶ 6bb. (stating that Tenaris conducted “a world-wide [internal] investigation 
of its business operations and controls” and “provided extensive, thorough, real-time 
cooperation with the staff of the Division and DOJ which included timely, voluntary 
and complete disclosure of certain conduct” to the government). 
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Committee of its Board of Directors, Tenaris secured the Commission’s 
first-ever DPA.192 
The Tenaris DPA requires the company to disgorge approximately 
$5.4 million and forgo taxes paid on revenue received from improperly 
obtained service contracts; certify to the Commission its compliance 
with the terms of the DPA; revamp its Code of Conduct and commit to 
annual updates and revisions of the same; require all directors, officers 
and management level employees to certify annually compliance with 
the Code of Conduct; and effectively train all officers, managers and 
employees with financial, accounting or government relations 
responsibilities and anyone else within the company involved in 
activities that implicate Tenaris’s anti-corruption policies.193 Notably, 
Tenaris executed a NPA with the DOJ related to the same alleged facts 
that gave rise to the DPA with the Commission.194 
Neither the Carter’s Inc. NPA nor the Tenaris DPA required the 
companies to retain an independent consultant. As with the DOJ, the 
SEC may view incentivizing companies to police themselves – while 
simultaneously making examples of non-cooperators – as a more 
effective use of its resources than traditional enforcement efforts.195 The 
extent and frequency with which the Commission will continue using 
NPAs and DPAs remains to be seen, but judging by the DOJ’s use of 
such agreements, NPAs are less likely to draw a monitor than are 
DPAs.196 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See id; see also Press Release, SEC, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s 
First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news 
/press/2011/2011-112.htm. 
 193. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Tenaris, S.A. and the SEC, SEC 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf (paraphrasing 
the terms of Tenaris’s agreement with SEC). 
 194. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tenaris S.A. Agrees to Pay $3.5 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-629.html. 
 195. See SEC Cooperation Initiiative Press Release, supra note 182; Khuzami 
Speech, supra note 180. 
 196. Of the DOJ’s ten agreements requiring a monitor in 2010, three were NPAs and 
seven were DPAs. See Jaclyn Jaeger, SEC Gets into the Non-Prosecution Agreement 
Act, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 25, 2011. 
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 ii. Independent Consultants and Monitors 
The Division of the SEC pursues civil lawsuits, and quasi-criminal 
causes of action and remedies in federal district court and in 
administrative proceedings.197 In those proceedings, the Commission 
seeks monetary penalties; injunctions, which subject violators to fines or 
imprisonment for contempt; disgorgement of illegal profits; and 
suspension from service as a corporate officer or director.198 The vast 
majority of civil enforcement actions are resolved before trial.199 
In the post-SOX era, the SEC has imposed a variety of governance 
reforms. Broadly labeled “corporate therapeutics,”200 these initiatives 
have ranged in intrusiveness and have included cease-and-desist orders; 
new management structures; new compliance positions; new board-level 
committees; and new procedures for board-level decision-making.201 
Generally, corporate monitors have been reserved for the most egregious 
cases, particularly those involving criminal misconduct and jointly 
prosecuted by the DOJ.202 
The Commission has often required the appointment of 
independent consultants. They have been empowered to conduct 
investigations into compliance practices, to report their findings to the 
SEC, and to make recommendations for future compliance programs.203 
The corporation may not withhold any information from the 
Commission based on evidentiary privileges, and it must adopt the 
consultant’s recommendation.204 The target company, moreover, cannot 
dismiss the consultant without prior approval from the Commission.205 
Independent consultants have been praised for their ability to create 
a “temporal, structural, and dialogical space” in which stubborn cultural 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See SEC, About the Division Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
enforce/about.htm. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 429 (2010) (“The vast majority of the 
SEC’s civil enforcement actions result in settlement.”). 
 200. See Barnard, supra note 6, at 798. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 801 (“Typically . . . full-service monitors are appointed only in cases 
involving concurrent criminal charges brought by the Department of Justice.”). 
 203. Id. at 806-08. 
 204. Id. at 809. 
 205. Id. 
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and compliance issues can be addressed.206 Settlement agreements have 
often provided that the company review all preliminary 
recommendations by the consultant before they are finalized, thereby 
providing the firm with an opportunity to be heard. In a 2003 case 
involving Akorn, Inc., for example, the SEC required the corporation to 
engage an independent consultant to review the company’s “material 
internal accounting controls, practices, and policies related to accounts 
receivable.”207 The consultant was given 180 days to complete its review 
and submit a report documenting its findings and recommending 
improvements.208 Akorn then had 30 days to review the 
recommendations and propose alternate procedures designed to achieve 
the same goals.209 The consultant was required to evaluate Akorn’s 
proposals and make a final determination on the recommended course of 
action.210 Akorn was bound by the consultant’s final decisions and had 
to report to the staff of the Commission the decisions made and actions 
taken as a result of the consultant’s recommendations.211 Because Akorn 
was entitled to comment on the consultant’s findings and propose 
alternate methods, the final recommendations could not be made without 
a dialogue between the consultant and the company.212 
In addition to accounting programs, independent consultants have 
been charged with designing policies for: 
 foreign payments under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; 
 use and misuse of non-public information; 
 travel and entertainment expenses; 
 receipt and retention of e-mail communications; and 
 pricing policies.213 
The SEC views the use of independent consultants as an extension 
of its enforcement authority and a way to leverage its limited 
enforcement resources.214 
                                                                                                                 
 206. See Barnard, supra note 6, at 807 (citing Hess & Ford, Corporate Corruption 
and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
307, 336 (2008)). 
 207. Id. (citing In re Akorn, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,546, 2003 SEC 
LEXIS 2276, at *13 (Sept. 25, 2003)). 
 208. In re Akorn, No. 48,546, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2276, at *13-16. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. Barnard, supra note 6, at 808. 
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iii. SEC Guidance 
The SEC has not enunciated policies or procedures for selecting 
and appointing independent consultants or corporate monitors.215 
Because corporate monitors are reserved for those cases in which the 
DOJ is simultaneously pursuing criminal sanctions, the Morford and 
Grindler Memoranda provide the best guidance in joint enforcement 
actions.216 In civil cases, the following three criteria have been identified 
as crucial to the SEC’s decision to impose an independent consultant: 
1. whether better internal controls would have prevented the 
incident; 
2. the nature and extent of the remedial steps taken by the 
company since discovering the matter/problem/concern; 
and 
3. the pace of the settlement discussions—in protracted 
situations, a company has more time to address and rectify 
compliance issues, possibly rendering unnecessary the 
appointment of an independent consultant.217 
If the Commission decides to require the retention of an 
independent consultant, a staff lawyer typically drafts the initial 
proposed scope of the consultant’s duties and responsibilities. The 
parties then negotiate those provisions.218 
For their part, companies seek carefully to delineate the charter of 
the consultant and retain maximum flexibility in considering and 
implementing the consultant’s recommendations.219 Sometimes, the SEC 
defers the question of the scope of the consultant’s work to negotiations 
between the company and the consultant. In these instances, the SEC 
specifies only certain regulatory objectives that the consultant must 
achieve, and the parties develop the plan and processes.220 
Although the ultimate responsibility for approving the independent 
consultant lies with the court, the judiciary has often sought a 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See id. at 814-15. 
 215. See Barnard, supra note 6, at 798; see generally Press Release, SEC, Statement 
from the SEC Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. 
 216. See Grindler Memorandum, supra note 131. 
 217. Barnard, supra note 6, at 815. 
 218. See id. at 816-17. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Id. at 811. 
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recommendation from the Commission following a careful 
consideration of the candidates proposed by the target company.221 The 
SEC staff interviews the candidate(s) to assess their independence and 
perspective on enforcement actions.222 Nominated candidates with the 
requisite expertise and background are rarely contested. 
From the company’s perspective, the most important elements of an 
independent consultant’s charter are the scope of her responsibilities, her 
ability to understand the compliance challenges of the industrial sector, 
her willingness to consider objectively the company’s realties and, of 
course, her fees and expenses.223 At the same time, to be successful, the 
consultant must garner the confidence of the SEC staff.224 An even-
keeled temperament with a commitment to fundamental fairness and the 
development of a constructive dialogue with the board of directors and 
the senior management team are also helpful attributes.225 Quite 
appropriately, settlement agreements stipulate that the consultant cannot 
do any work for the company for a period of two years following the 
consultancy. Consequently, candidates are very particular about which 
appointments they accept.226 
iv. Case Study: WorldCom, Inc. 
Following a voluntary disclosure of egregious accounting 
misconduct to the SEC staff and other enforcement agencies, the 
Commission filed its initial complaint against WorldCom, Inc. in late 
June 2002.227 The SEC charged WorldCom with having inflated its 
income by approximately $3.8 billion through an illegal scheme, and the 
Staff sought the immediate appointment of a corporate monitor, 
injunctive relief, and a civil monetary penalty.228 The initial justification 
for the corporate monitor was to “ensure compliance” with any court-
                                                                                                                 
 221. O’Hare, supra note 6, at 108. 
 222. Barnard, supra note 6, at 820-21. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. at 823. 
 227. SEC, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR INVESTORS REGARDING THE POTENTIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEC’S CIVIL PENALTY JUDGMENT AGAINST WORLDCOM, INC. IN 
THE SEC V. WORLDCOM CASE, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/ 
wcominfo111103.htm. 
 228. Id. 
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ordered evidentiary rulings, protect against spoliation, and prevent over-
compensation of WorldCom’s executives.229 Following the entry of a 
Rule 21 Order on June 28, 2002, United States District Judge Jed Rakoff 
gave the parties five days to submit a roster of proposed corporate 
monitors.230 The SEC and WorldCom nominated three individuals and 
Judge Rakoff selected Richard C. Breeden, former Chairman of the 
SEC.231 
Although the initial role of WorldCom’s corporate monitor was 
limited to preserving evidence and preventing excessive compensation, 
Mr. Breeden’s responsibilities quickly expanded. First, on July 15, 2002, 
the court issued an order redefining “compensation” to include not only 
payments made to WorldCom executives, but also payments made to 
outside advisors, investment bankers, restructuring specialists, and other 
consultants.232 On August 1, 2002, Judge Rakoff ordered that he be kept 
apprised of “every aspect of the business he deems relevant to his 
assessments” in order to facilitate Mr. Breeden’s task in addressing 
compensation issues.233 In addition, Judge Rakoff ordered that the 
corporate monitor be granted access to all employees and to meetings of 
the board of directors and committees thereof.234 
On November 26, 2002, WorldCom entered into a partial 
settlement with the SEC.235 This resolution did not address civil 
penalties, but it cost WorldCom $500 million in cash and $250 million 
in stock.236 The settlement authorized Mr. Breeden to undertake a 
comprehensive review of WorldCom’s corporate governance standards 
and make recommendations to the board for improvements.237 In June 
2003, WorldCom agreed to adopt each of Mr. Breeden’s 
recommendations.238 This transformation of Mr. Breeden’s mission was 
                                                                                                                 
 229. O’Hare, supra note 6, at 94. 
 230. Id. at 95. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 96. 
 233. Id. at 97 (quoting SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14201, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002)). 
 234. Id at 97-98. 
 235. Id. at 98 (citing Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Defendant 
WorldCom, Inc., SEC v. WorldCom, Inc. No 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002)). 
 236. Id. at 98 n.40. 
 237. Id at 98. 
 238. Id. at 98-99 
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remarkable and has been the subject of considerable discussion by 
scholars and practitioners.239 
Even after Mr. Breeden submitted his much-anticipated 
recommendations, a 147-page report entitled Restoring Trust, he 
continued to play an integral role at the company.240 He determined 
compensation packages for WorldCom’s new management team, 
attended all board meetings, played a material role in the development 
of the company’s monthly budget, participated in the appointment of 
new directors, forced at least one shareholder-elected board member to 
resign over an alleged conflict of interest, led the talks with the 
Government to restore WorldCom’s ability to bid on government 
contracts, and ultimately was involved in negotiations with companies 
seeking to acquire WorldCom some three years after his appointment.241 
Mr. Breeden’s mandate was to be the District Court’s eyes and ears 
thereby elevating the monitor’s stature to that of a federal judge.242 
Under such circumstances, the company was left without the sort of 
recourse now envisioned by the Grindler Memorandum, namely a means 
by which the DOJ may play a role in resolving disputes between the 
corporation and the monitor. 
c. The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
i. Regulatory Initiatives 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) oversees the enforcement of federal health care laws and the 
administration of health care programs, including Medicare and 
Medicaid.243 HHS is required to work closely with state and local 
governments, as many HHS-funded services are provided at the local 
level, by state and county agencies, and through private sector grants.244 
The OIG, in turn, is responsible for audits, evaluations, investigations, 
                                                                                                                 
 239. See, e.g., O’Hare, supra note 6, at 99; Hess & Ford, supra note 206; Khanna & 
Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1713. 
 240. O’Hare, supra note 6, at 99. 
 241. Id. at 101-02. 
 242. See id. at 103. 
 243. See About HHS, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 23, 
2011). 
 244. Id. 
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and law enforcement efforts related to HHS programs and operations.245 
Charged with protecting the integrity of HHS programs, as well as the 
health and welfare of the beneficiaries of those programs,246 the OIG is 
required to report both to the Secretary of HHS and to Congress 
regarding general compliance and management problems within 
programs subject to HHS oversight. The OIG must also offer 
recommendations regarding correction of any such issues. 
In collaboration initially with the Health Care Financing 
Administration247 and with reference to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and input from the private health care sector, the OIG has 
developed, and continuously updated and refined, segment-specific 
compliance program guidance premised on the core elements of an 
effective compliance program.248 First published in 1997,249 what 
became the “seven elements”250 of a comprehensive health care 
compliance program include:  
                                                                                                                 
 245. Office of the Inspector Gen., HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/open/contacts/oig 
.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 246. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 § 2 (1978) 
(codified as amended 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-12). 
 247. In 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration became the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services. See http://www.socialsecurity-disability.org/ 
glossary/health-care-financing-administration (last visited Jan. 11, 2012); see 68 Fed. 
Reg. 23731 (May 5, 2003). 
 248. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg. 
9435 (Mar. 3, 1997); see also OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for 
Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858 (Jan. 31, 2005); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731 (May 5, 2003); OIG Compliance 
Program Guidance for Medicare+Choice Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 61893 (Nov. 15, 
1999); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for the Durable Medical Equipment, 
Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supply Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 36368 (July 6, 1999); OIG 
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (Feb. 23, 1998). 
 249. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg. 
9435 (Mar. 3, 1997). 
 250. The first compliance program guidance, issued in March 1997, identified 
eleven elements. 62 Fed. Reg. 9435, 9436 (Mar. 3, 1997). The second compliance 
program guidance, issued in February 1998 and addressing hospitals, articulated seven 
elements of a “comprehensive compliance program,” 63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8989 (Feb. 23, 
1998), which have been repeated with slight variation in each successive compliance 
program guidance that the OIG has issued. See OIG Supplemental Compliance Program 
Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858, 4874 n.83 (Jan. 31, 2005); OIG Compliance 
Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23732-33 
(May 5, 2003); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Medicare+Choice 
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1. the designation of a chief compliance officer who reports 
directly to the board of directors or other governing body of 
the organization, is invested with authority to develop and 
oversee a compliance program and is instrumental in the 
institution and operation of a management compliance 
committee;251  
                                                                                                                 
Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 61893, 61896 (Nov. 15, 1999); OIG Compliance Program 
Guidance for the Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supply 
Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 36368, 36371 (July 6, 1999). 
 251. The Sentencing Commission, commenting on the application of the Guidelines, 
has long advocated the implementation of “standards and procedures” and the vesting 
in a specific “high-level” employee of “overall responsibility” for the organization’s 
compliance with them, as two of seven suggested minimum due diligence steps towards 
creating an “effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.” See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2 App. Note 3(k) (Nov. 1, 
1994). Differing slightly from the OIG’s “seven elements,” see U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1, 2010), the Sentencing Commission did not propose the 
“seven minimum steps for a compliance program” for inclusion as an official Guideline 
until 2004; they were articulated previously as Application Note 3(k) to §8A1.2. See, 
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2 App. Note 3(k) 
(Nov. 30, 2003). Those “seven minimum steps,” moreover, did not mandate that the 
employee charged with oversight of the compliance function have direct access to the 
organization’s “governing body”; that requirement came with the elevation of the 
Application Note to a Guideline. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, § 8A1.2 App. Note 3(k) (Nov. 30, 2003) with PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B2.1(b)(2) (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.ussc.gov/Legal 
/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/20040114_RFP_Amendments.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 
2012), also available at 69 Fed. Reg. 2169 (Jan. 14, 2004), 
http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2004/01/14/04-806/sentencing-guidelines-for-
united-states-courts (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). 
  There is, then, an apparent corporate governance divergence between the 
Guidelines and the OIG Guidance. Unlike the Guidelines, the OIG generally has opined 
that the compliance officer should not be subordinate to the organization’s legal or 
finance functions. Compare, e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 23731 n.13 (May 5, 2003) (“The OIG 
believes it is generally not advisable for the compliance function to be subordinate to 
the [organization’s] general counsel or comptroller or similar financial officer.”), and 
64 Fed. Reg. 36368 n.135 (July 6, 1999) (same), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (Nov. 1, 2010) (calling for the delegation of “day-to-day 
operational responsibility” for the compliance and ethics program in a specific person 
who reports “periodically to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing 
authority” of the organization, or subgroup thereof). The OIG acknowledges, however, 
that this suggested corporate governance framework, as with other recommended 
elements of an effective compliance program, may not be feasible or appropriate given 
the resources available to, or circumstances confronting, all organizations operating in 
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2. the development and dissemination of written standards of 
conduct and policies and procedures that serve to guide and 
foster compliant, ethical behavior;  
3. the implementation of a training program;  
4. the establishment and maintenance of a hotline to receive 
anonymously compliance complaints and concerns;  
5. the creation of a framework for responding to reported 
incidents of non-compliance and the enforcement of 
disciplinary action that explicitly prohibits retaliation;  
6. the use of audits and other devices to identify, measure and 
address compliance concerns; and  
7. a mechanism for investigating and remediating systemic 
compliance problems.252 
While it is well-settled that the OIG’s compliance program 
guidance does not purport to be mandatory,253 if an organization enters 
into a corporate integrity agreement, aspects of it will become so; most 
notably, by way of example, in virtually every CIA, the OIG requires 
the separation of the compliance and legal functions within the C-suite 
and a direct reporting line from the chief compliance officer to the 
Board of Directors.254 
In discharging its enforcement duties, HHS is authorized to levy 
both fiscal and exclusionary penalties and does so, typically, through the 
                                                                                                                 
the health care sector. See, e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23732. As discussed in notes 253-
54 and their accompanying text, the OIG’s flexibility in this regard evaporates if an 
organization becomes subject to a corporate integrity agreement; the compliance officer 
will be required to be independent from the offices of the General Counsel and Chief 
Financial Officer. 
 252. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8989 (Feb. 23, 1998) (OIG Compliance Program 
Guidance for Hospitals). 
 253. See 68 Fed. Reg. 23731 (“The contents of this guidance should not be viewed 
as mandatory or as an exclusive discussion of the advisable elements of a compliance 
program. The document is intended to present voluntary guidance to the industry and 
not to represent binding standards for pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); see also id. at 
23732. 
 254. See 64 Fed. Reg. 61893, 61895 n.13 (Nov. 15, 1999) (corporate integrity 
agreements “require many of the elements included in this compliance program 
guidance”); see, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen. 
& Bayer Healthcare, LLC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/ 
agreements/fully_executed_bayer_cia_112508.pdf (mandating that the “Compliance 
Officer not be or be subordinate to the General Counsel or Chief Financial Officer”). 
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OIG.255 The sanctions in the OIG’s arsenal include civil monetary 
penalties (“CMPs”) and exclusion from participation in federal health 
care programs.256 If a health care company is excluded from 
participation, it may no longer bill any federal health care program for 
services over the period of exclusion.257 The Civil Monetary Penalties 
Law (the “CMPL”) grants such authority, as does the Social Security 
Act, by reference to many of the provisions of the CMPL.258 
A. Corporate Integrity Agreements 
OIG often enters into settlement agreements with parties against 
whom it has sought or is seeking CMPs and/or exclusion from 
participation in federal health care programs.259 While the resolutions 
and corresponding compliance obligations often contain common 
elements or themes, these resolutions and compliance obligations, over 
the past 20 years, have become increasingly sophisticated and holistic. 
                                                                                                                 
 255. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 7, authorizes the Secretary of HHS to 
seek civil monetary penalties and assessments (CMPs). See Civil Monetary Penalties 
and Affirmative Exclusions, HHS.GOV, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp 
/index.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Civil Monetary Penalties]. The Civil 
Monetary Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006), notes additional direct authority 
to levy CMPs for a wide variety of conduct that violates federal health care laws. Id. 
The OIG is authorized to seek different amounts of civil monetary penalties and 
assessments based on the type of violation at issue. 42 CFR § 1003.103 (2009). For 
instance, in a case of false or fraudulent claims, OIG may seek a penalty of up to 
$10,000 for each item or service improperly claimed, and an assessment of up to three 
times the amount improperly claimed. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(B) (2006). In a 
kickback case, OIG may seek a penalty of up to $50,000 for each improper act and 
damages of up to three times the amount of the remuneration at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7a(a)(7) (2006).  
 256. CAROL E. BOWEN, THE LEGAL IMPACT OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID LEADING 
LAWYERS ON THE ROLE OF STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES, EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS, AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 2009 WL 534744, at *4; Civil Monetary 
Penalties, supra note 255. 
 257. BOWEN, supra note 256, at *4. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Civil Monetary Penalties, supra note 255; Sharon Finegan, The False Claims 
Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity 
Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 651 
(2007). 
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These resolutions address the target company’s governance, culture, and 
specific conduct.260 
Compliance expectations and requirements are usually 
memorialized in CIAs,261 which include negotiated protocols designed to 
ensure a company’s compliance with applicable federal and state 
statutes, regulations, and program requirements.262 They typically 
require a compliance program to have certain components and 
operational features, including board-level oversight. To that end, the 
OIG has required, through CIAs, that an organization’s Board of 
Directors, or Compliance Committee thereof, retain an independent 
health care compliance advisor to assist in the performance of its 
compliance program obligations.263 CIAs also generally impose 
comprehensive and rigorous periodic certification and reporting 
requirements.264 
In determining the propriety and scope of a CIA, the OIG will 
consider all factors involved in the underlying investigation, including 
the misconduct at issue and remedial measures undertaken by the 
targeted company.265 Given the oversight powers of HHS over the 
industry, as a practical matter, “health care providers have little choice 
but to agree to CIAs containing even the most onerous of terms in their 
settlement of suits.”266 The ultimate terms and provisions of a CIA are 
informed by a number of considerations, including, among others: 
 whether the company self-reported the alleged misdeeds; 
 any adverse economic impact to a federal health care 
program; 
 the obligations of a successor-in-interest to the offending 
entity; 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Corporate Integrity Agreements, HHS.GOV, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 261. Id.; Finegan, supra note 259, at 657. 
 262. ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL CIVIL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.05, (2009). 
 263. See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between OIG and Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation, § III.A.3.c, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 6, 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Novartis_Pharmaceuticals_Corporation_ 
09292010.pdf. 
 264. Id. at §§ III.A.3.c-d. 
 265. See Finegan, supra note 259, at 658. 
 266. See id. 
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 the organization’s continued participation in federal health 
care programs or the type of business that fostered the 
alleged fraud; 
 the likely repetition of the alleged behavior; 
 the amount of time that has passed since the conduct 
occurred; and 
 the existence of an effective compliance program and the 
organization’s willingness to implement compliance 
measures and certification obligations.267 
The presumptive term of a CIA is now five years.268 Some CIAs 
have included longer or even indefinite time periods, whereas others 
have provided for early termination upon the fulfillment of certain 
contingencies or obligations.269 
All CIAs require the company to establish a formal compliance 
program.270 This will almost always “require the corporation to 
implement improved internal controls[,] . . . appoint a compliance 
officer, [and] conduct employee training . . . .”271 Key features of CIA-
mandated compliance programs usually include: 
 the appointment of a compliance committee; 
 the development of written standards and policies; 
 the retention of an Independent Review Organization 
(“IRO”); 
 the establishment of a confidential disclosure program; 
 prohibitions regarding ineligible persons; 
 prompt reporting of overpayments and ongoing 
investigations/legal proceedings; and 
 the creation and submission of comprehensive, certified 
implementation and annual reports to OIG.272 
CIAs often require the target company to relinquish cognizable 
claims to evidentiary privileges or doctrines with respect to legal and 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Id. 
 268. Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; Finegan, supra note 259, at 
663. 
 269. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 2. 
 270. Finegan, supra note 259, at 659; FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 3. 
 271. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 686. 
 272. Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; see also Richard M. Cooper, 
The Need for Oversight of Agency Policies for Settling Enforcement Actions, 59 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 835, 842 (2007). 
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compliance advice the company receives in relation to the CIA and 
federal health care programs.273 
CIAs also work to ensure that the OIG is aware of fundamental 
changes in the subject corporation.274 For instance, in the event of a 
divestiture, sale or acquisition, the corporation will be required to notify 
the OIG. Furthermore, the CIA is not extinguished by such a transaction 
but travels to the new corporate entity.275 CIAs generally require notice 
of changes to the corporation’s compliance function, including changes 
in the position of Chief Compliance Officer, the composition of the 
Compliance Committee, and office status, i.e., whether an office 
remains open or has been closed.276 
B. Independent Review Organizations 
CIAs almost always require the company to retain an IRO to 
evaluate and report on the facets of the company’s operations which 
were implicated by, or involved in, the allegations or claims that have 
been resolved.277 IROs, historically, have been accounting, auditing, or 
consulting firms, and typically they are tasked with evaluating and 
creating reports regarding the effectiveness of the company’s 
compliance program.278 
IROs must be independent and, over the years, the OIG has adopted 
standards set forth in the Government Auditing Standards of the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to ensure that 
independence.279 Among other things, IROs may not perform 
                                                                                                                 
 273. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 3. 
 274. See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen. and 
Bayer LLC, supra note 254; Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector 
Gen. & Eli Lilly & Co., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/ 
agreements/eli_lilly_and_company_01142009.pdf. 
 275. Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; see also FABRIKANT ET AL., 
262 note 263, at 3; Cooper, supra note 272, at 842. 
 276. Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; see also FABRIKANT ET AL., 
supra note 262, at 3; Cooper, supra note 272, at 842. 
 277. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 686. 
 278. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 5. 
 279. See ALICE G. GOSFIELD, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 7:12 (2009); 
GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS: 2010 EXPOSURE DRAFT, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10853g.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
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management functions or make management decisions and should not 
audit their own work.280 
The OIG has addressed independence in several publications,281 and 
in 2010, issued additional guidelines regarding IRO independence.282 
Therein, the OIG reiterated that the GAO’s Government Auditing 
Standards guide any IRO selection and appointment and noted lists of 
services that would and would not impair an IRO’s independence and 
                                                                                                                 
 280. GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 279; see also Gosfield, supra 
note 275, § 7:12. 
 281. For instance, the OIG addressed IRO independence in detail in a 2004 
publication titled Frequently Asked Questions Related to IRO Independence. Noting 
“the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and an increased focus on issues relating to auditor 
independence,” OIG issued a series of “relevant principles” to be used in assessing the 
independence of IROs. The following “relevant principles” were among those 
discussed: 
 Financial Audits: An organization that serves as an entity’s financial auditor 
may nonetheless also serve as the entity’s IRO. 
 Bookkeeping and Tax Services: An organization that provides bookkeeping 
and tax services may also serve as the entity’s IRO, although this depends on 
the nature of the bookkeeping and tax services. 
 Compliance Review: An organization that conducts a compliance review for 
the entity prior to execution of the CIA will generally be allowed to serve as 
IRO, unless it has been involved in implementing the recommendations of the 
review. 
 Training: An organization that has provided general compliance training can 
also serve as an IRO. Where, however, the organization has provided general 
compliance training on coding and billing, it is unlikely to be sufficiently 
independent to serve as an IRO. 
 Hotline Operation: An organization that assists an entity in operating its hotline 
will generally be able to serve as IRO, unless it has been involved in decision-
making operations. 
 Policies and Procedures: An organization that assists an entity in developing 
policies pursuant to the CIA will most likely be prohibited from serving as 
IRO. 
 Software: An organization that has developed software used by an entity is 
likely to be precluded from serving as the entity’s IRO, unless the entity has 
made substantive changes to the software. 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS RELATED TO IRO INDEPENDENCE (on file with author); see also 
Gosfield, supra note 279, § 7:12. 
 282. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. GUIDANCE ON IRO INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY 3-4, 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/docs/OIG_guidance_on_IRO_independence 
_2010.pdf. 
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objectivity.283 The following were services deemed not to impair IRO 
independence: 
 furnishing general compliance training to address CIA 
requirements and employee responsibilities; 
 performing routine tasks related to the company’s 
confidential disclosure programs, such as answering a 
confidential hotline; 
 performing screening for ineligible persons by entering 
employee names into an exclusion database; 
 evaluating and presenting conclusions and 
recommendations regarding the company’s compliance 
program prior to the company’s CIA being executed; 
 providing personnel to perform work plan procedures that 
are developed by the company’s internal audit department, 
so long as they are not related to subject matter of CIA 
review; 
 furnishing consulting services to the company under an 
engagement that is completed prior to the start of the CIA 
review and (1) that is unrelated to the subject matter of the 
CIA review and (2) that does not involve performance of 
management functions; and 
 performing an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the company’s internal controls, even if those controls 
relate to the subject matter of the CIA review, so long as the 
IRO is not responsible for designing or implementing 
corrective action.284 
By contrast, any of the following scenarios suggest a lack of 
independence: 
 the company utilizing a billing system or coding software 
that was developed or designed by the IRO and the IRO 
being engaged to perform a claims review thereof; 
 IRO personnel furnishing specific training that addresses 
the subject matter of the CIA review; 
 the IRO developing the company’s policies, procedures, or 
internal control systems; 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See id. 
 284. Id. 
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 the IRO participating in decision making functions related 
to the confidential disclosure program, such as determining 
which allegations warrant further investigation or corrective 
action; 
 the IRO performing an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the company’s internal controls associated 
with specific risk areas addressed in the CIA and 
implementing new processes or internal controls relating 
thereto; 
 the company outsourcing its internal audit function to the 
IRO; and/or 
 the IRO being engaged to provide consulting services to the 
company during the term of the CIA on a matter related to 
the subject matter thereof.285 
ii. The Retention of Monitors 
Some CIAs also require the retention of an independent monitor to 
conduct the oversight mandated by DOJ and SEC resolutions.286 
Typically, these monitors evaluate internal quality control systems and 
corporate infrastructure.287 In addition, the monitor often has broad 
access to the company’s facilities, data, records, and staff.288 Like their 
counterparts in other enforcement proceedings, they must submit 
periodic reports to the OIG and the company.289 
The OIG generally selects the independent monitor, with some 
input from the target company. The company pays the monitor’s fees 
and related expenses.290 Monitors appointed pursuant to a CIA do, 
however, “typically serve at the behest of the OIG and may be removed 
solely at the discretion of the OIG.”291 
                                                                                                                 
 285. Id. 
 286. These independent monitors are distinct from both IROs and from OIG lawyers 
who serve as OIG’s internal monitors of the CIA. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 
5; see also Finegan, supra note 259, at 659. 
 287. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 5. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Finegan, supra note 259, at 659; FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 258, at 5. 
 290. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 5. 
 291. Id. 
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iii. Case Studies: Bayer and Eli Lilly 
Over the past several decades, the OIG has entered into numerous 
CIAs with health care providers, health insurers and managed care 
companies, clinical laboratories, medical device manufacturers, and 
research and generic pharmaceutical companies.292 Among the most 
significant recent CIAs are those involving Bayer Health Care LLC 
(“Bayer”)293 and Eli Lilly and Company (“Eli Lilly”).294 These CIAs 
broke new ground in a number of respects, most notably creating clear 
enterprise-wide accountability in the executive ranks and the 
boardroom.295 
The CIAs for both Bayer and Eli Lilly include sections regarding 
“Management Accountability and Certifications.” Before the Bayer and 
Eli Lilly CIAs, a compliance officer possessed the sole responsibility for 
certifying that a company had: (1) complied with its obligations under 
the CIA; (2) fulfilled training requirements; (3) reviewed and updated 
compliance documents and policies; and (4) complied with federal 
health care program requirements.296 The new “Management 
Accountability and Certifications” require additional representations not 
only from the compliance officer but also from extensive lists of 
executive-level and management personnel.297 Both Bayer and Eli Lilly 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents, HHS.gov, http://oig.hhs 
.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2010). 
 293. Bayer entered into a CIA with OIG that became effective on November 25, 
2008, as part of a broader civil settlement to resolve allegations that it paid kickbacks to 
certain diabetic suppliers between 1998 and 2007, thereby causing the suppliers to 
submit false Medicare claims. Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of 
Inspector Gen. and Bayer LLC, supra note 254. See Scott A. Memmott, Recent Trends 
Involving CIAs Significantly Raise Stakes for Health Care Industry Participants, 11 No. 
2 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 51 (2009). 
 294. As part of a global settlement resulting from its introduction of misbranded 
drugs, namely Zyprexa, into interstate commerce between 1999 and 2003; Eli Lilly 
entered into a CIA with OIG that became effective on January 14, 2009. Corporate 
Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen. and Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 
274. Eli Lilly entered into the CIA. Memmott, supra note 293, at 51. 
 295. Memmott, supra note 293, at 51. 
 296. Memmott, supra note 293, at 53-54. 
 297. See id. 
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are, therefore, required to submit certifications from a broad array of 
individuals at multiple levels of the organization.298 
The Bayer and Eli Lilly CIAs also addressed corporate governance; 
they imposed significant new requirements on the companies’ respective 
boards of directors.299 Both companies’ boards are required to arrange 
for performance reviews of the effectiveness of their compliance 
programs for each reporting period.300 Bayer was also required to create 
an additional panel of “three independent and objective individuals or 
entities with expertise in compliance with federal health care program 
and FDA requirements.”301 This panel must prepare and submit a written 
report addressing their review of the compliance program and include 
recommendations to the board regarding Bayer’s compliance 
program.302 
d. The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
i. Regulatory Initiatives 
In the late 1980s, the EPA began conducting enforcement and 
compliance investigations of corporations, municipalities and other 
organizations.303 Today, those inquiries are performed by the National 
Enforcement Investigations Center (the “NEIC”), a unit of the EPA. If 
an inquiry reveals an incident or pattern of non-compliance, the NEIC 
works with the EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
(“OECA”) to develop a civil settlement agreement and to implement a 
Compliance-Focused Environmental Management System (the 
“CFEMS”).304 The CFEMS is comprised of twelve elements,305 intended 
to bring the target of the EPA investigation back into compliance with 
                                                                                                                 
 298. This included, among others, the companies’ chairmen; the chief executive 
officers; executive directors and vice presidents; chief medical officers; and directors of 
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 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
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the applicable environmental protection laws, regulations and 
administrative rules. 
The twelve elements of a CFEMS are: 
1. Environmental Policy—the actual adoption by the 
organization of an environmental management system; 
2. Organization, Personnel, and Oversight—the CFEMS must 
identify and define the specific duties and responsibilities 
of the key employees who will implement the new system; 
3. Accountability and Responsibility—includes both 
incentives for managers and employees to comply with the 
new CFEMS as well as the potential consequences for 
noncompliance; 
4. Environmental Requirements—describes applicable 
environmental requirements and interprets their 
applicability to the overall system; 
5. Assessment, Prevention, Control—describes ongoing 
process for identifying and assessing the organization’s 
performance under the system as well as a system for 
documenting routine self-inspections; 
6. Environmental Incident and Non-Compliance 
Investigations—establishes procedures for both internal and 
external reporting of incidents of non-compliance as well as 
identification of problems to assist in correction of 
noncompliance; 
7. Environmental Training, Awareness and Competence—
describes the organization’s training to ensure personnel are 
aware of applicable requirements and procedures to follow 
to ensure compliance; 
8. Environmental Planning and Organizational Decision-
making—requires the organization to establish written 
targets and objectives for improving environmental 
performance on an annual basis; 
9. Maintenance of Records and Documentation—identifies 
records necessary for support of an Environmental 
Management System (“EMS”), personnel responsible for 
maintaining all records and security measures necessary to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information; 
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10. Pollution Prevention—describes the organization’s internal 
process for preventing and/or minimizing waste and 
emissions; 
11. Continuing Program Evaluation and Improvement—
describes the schedule of periodic evaluation and auditing 
of the EMS; and 
12. Public Involvement/Community Outreach—requires a 
program for ongoing community education regarding 
general environmental awareness.306 
Since 1997, the EPA has consistently encouraged the use of 
independent third party auditors to conduct periodic examinations of the 
EMS.307 Assuming a civil resolution is consummated, the auditor need 
not be appointed until the organization has had sufficient time to 
implement and refine the EMS.308 However, within one to three years, 
depending on the size of the organization and the scope of the non-
compliance issues, the EPA suggests that any settlement agreement 
should require at least one independent audit, and the agency recognizes 
that additional compliance audits may be warranted depending on the 
particular circumstances of that organization. Results of these 
assessments are to be reported to the organization and to the EPA.309 
Guidance from the EPA suggests that the CFEMS should include 
provisions regarding the selection criteria for the independent auditor. 
She should not have been involved in the initial review of the CFEMS, 
but she should be qualified to conduct an audit under EPA Operating 
Procedure ISO 19011;310 have expertise and competence in regulatory 
programs under both federal and state environmental laws; and have at 
least a bachelor’s degree.311 In addition, the independent auditor may not 
have any direct financial stake in the outcome of the EMS audit.312 The 
company implementing the CFEMS should submit the identity of a 
potential auditor to the EPA for approval within one year of the effective 
date of the CFEMS. The EPA will notify the company whether the 
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 307. Sisk, supra note 303, at 4; see also Guidance John P. Suarez, Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance to Regional 
Administrators (I-X) & Regional Counsel (1-X) (June 12, 2003). 
 308. See Sisk, supra note 303, at 4. 
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proposed independent auditor candidate is acceptable, and if so, the 
proposed candidate must be retained within ten days and conduct the 
audit within 60 days of the EPA’s approval of her.313 
The audit should be conducted in accordance with ISO 19011 and 
the auditor shall assess the following: 
1. whether there is a defined system or planned program for 
the EMS; 
2. to what extent the program has been implemented and is 
being maintained; 
3. the adequacy of the company’s internal self-assessment 
programs under the CFEMS; 
4. whether the company is effectively communicating 
environmental requirements to its employees and those 
working on its behalf; 
5. whether further improvements are necessary; 
6. whether there are observed deviations from the company’s 
written requirements and procedures; and 
7. whether continual improvement is occurring.314 
ii. Case Study: Overseas Shipbuilding Group, Inc. 
While the EPA oversees all civil enforcement of environmental 
protection laws, and investigates alleged criminal violations of 
environmental protection laws, criminal prosecutions for violations of 
these laws are handled by the DOJ with assistance and input from the 
EPA’s criminal enforcement program.315 Accordingly, the same 
principles and DOJ memoranda that guide prosecutions of corporations 
for general corporate wrongdoing, inform the prosecution of 
corporations for criminal violations of environmental protection laws.316 
As has been the recent trend in the DOJ’s handling of prosecution of 
                                                                                                                 
 313. Id. at Appendix A. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See Enforcement, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/index-e.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 316. See Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental 
Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by 
the Violator (July 1, 1991), JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm (last 
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corporations, monitors are also being used with greater frequency in 
criminal environmental cases.317 
In December 2006, the DOJ issued a press release announcing that 
it had entered into a plea agreement with Overseas Shipholding Group, 
Inc. (“Overseas”) under which Overseas pleaded guilty to thirty-three 
felony counts of violations to the Clean Water Act and Oil Pollution 
Act.318 Pursuant to the resolution, Overseas was placed on organizational 
probation for three years and agreed to pay $37 million in fines and 
contributions to several environmental community service programs.319 
The fine was one of the largest fiscal penalties imposed for 
environmental violations in the history of the EPA. Overseas was also 
required to implement an Environmental Compliance Plan (“ECP”) to 
ensure that future violations would not occur. 
The ECP required the company to appoint an operational 
compliance officer.320 This officer could not be an employee of the 
company, and though external to the company, was to be granted access 
to “all records, documents, facilities, and vessels throughout OSG’s 
operational organization . . . .”321 The operational compliance officer 
was charged with supplying reports to Overseas’ Chief Executive 
Officer regarding the company’s compliance with and implementation 
of the Environmental Compliance Plan and other environmental 
protection requirements.322  
Overseas also was required to provide the DOJ with a list of 
proposed candidates for an external audit group within thirty days of the 
entry of the plea agreement.323 The group would perform an initial audit 
of the company’s operation to review and identify any aspects of 
Overseas’ operations that could potentially impact the environment.324 
                                                                                                                 
 317. See SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/cases/criminal/summary.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012); see 
also Guidance John P. Suarez, supra note 307, at 2. 
 318. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Overseas Shipholding Group Inc. Will 
Pay Largest-Ever Penalty for Concealing Vessel Pollution (Dec. 19, 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/December/06_opa_849.html. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Environmental Compliance Plan, United States v. Overseas Shipholding 
Group, Inc., No 06 Civ. 65, 163 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2006), at 4.  
 321. Id. at 4; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 318. 
 322. Environmental Compliance Plan, Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., No 06 
Civ. 65, 163, at 4-5. 
 323. Id. at 9.  
 324. Id. 
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The external audit group was also charged with evaluating the 
company’s implementation of an EMS and other environmental training 
and compliance programs deemed necessary.325 
Finally, within 18 months of the end of the three-year probationary 
period, Overseas was required to identify yet another candidate or 
candidates to serve as a third-party auditor for a final compliance 
audit326 to determine whether Overseas had fully implemented its EMS 
and established complete compliance with the ECP included in the plea 
agreement.327 The findings of this final audit were submitted to the DOJ 
and the company.328 
The Overseas Environmental Compliance Program was one of the 
most comprehensive plea agreements in an environmental case in the 
history of the EPA’s Criminal Investigation group.329 Since the Overseas 
case, the DOJ has increasingly required independent auditors or 
corporate monitors to be a part of its plea agreements and ECPs.330 In 
2009 and 2010, monitors or independent auditors were installed in the 
majority of criminal cases for corporate environmental protection 
violations.331 
e. The United States Department of Labor 
i. Regulatory Initiatives 
The DOL is responsible for promoting the welfare of job 
applicants, wage earners, and retirees through the improvement of 
working conditions.332 In accordance with that mandate, the DOL 
enforces a variety of federal laws, including those that guarantee 
workers’ rights to safe and healthful working conditions, a minimum 
                                                                                                                 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 18.  
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 19. 
 329. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Press Release, supra note 318. 
 330. See Criminal Press Releases 2005/2006, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov 
/compliance/resources/cases/criminal/highlights/2006/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2012). 
 331. See id. 
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hourly wage and overtime pay, freedom from employment 
discrimination, unemployment insurance, and other income support.333 
The Office of the Solicitor (the “SOL”) of the DOL represents the 
agency in enforcement and defensive litigation, as well as alternative 
dispute resolution activities.334 The SOL seeks to ensure equal treatment 
in hiring and employment practices, payment of wages and benefits, safe 
working conditions, standards of democracy and fiscal responsibility in 
labor organizations, and safeguards for the income security of retired 
workers.335 In its enforcement capacity, the SOL has often used third 
party monitors to ensure that employers adhere to the terms of 
settlement agreements with the DOL.336 What follows is a review of the 
key labor and employment statutes that have provided the basis and 
context for private sector oversight of corporate operations. 
ii. The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
OSHA “assure[s] so far as possible, every working man and 
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”337 The 
DOL, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a 
constituent body of the DOL, is responsible for enforcing OSHA.338 The 
DOL often pursues civil and administrative actions against corporations 
accused of violating OSHA. The settlement of these actions generally 
includes significant oversight of the corporation accused of the 
underlying violation.339 
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 334. Id. 
 335. Office of the Solicitor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/sol/media 
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 336. See discussion infra, Part I.A.2.e (ii-iv). 
 337. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006). 
 338. Id. § 670(d)(3). 
 339. Pursuant to its authority under OSHA, the DOL is authorized to make 
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operator, agent or employee.” Id. § 657(a). Where there is a reasonable belief that an 
employer has violated an OSHA standard, the DOL may issue a citation pursuant to 
OSHA’s general duty clause, or any regulation issued under OSHA. See id. § 658(a). If 
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OSHA. See id.; 29 CFR § 2200.33 (2009) et seq. OSHA specifically authorizes the 
DOL to “appear for and represent the Secretary in any civil action brought under 
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Third-party monitoring has been a key dimension to ensuring 
corporate compliance with settlements resulting from OSHA violations. 
For example, the DOL has required independent oversight throughout its 
attempts to settle claims resulting from the 2005 explosion at BP 
Products North America, Inc.’s (“BP”) Texas City, Texas refinery.340 
The DOL and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
initially reached a Stipulation and Agreement with BP on September 22, 
2005.341 The Stipulation and Agreement resulted in a $21 million fine, as 
well as third-party oversight through the retention of an independent 
firm to conduct a refinery-wide comprehensive audit and analysis of 
BP’s process safety management; and the engagement of a third-party 
expert to assess and report on the implementation of safety practices and 
procedures.342 Safety violations nonetheless continued at the refinery, 
and the DOL pursued additional claims against BP in October 2009.343 
On August 12, 2010, the DOL announced a second Stipulation and 
Agreement with BP. That agreement resulted in a record $50.6 million 
fine against BP, in addition to BP’s commitment to allocate an 
additional $500 million for remediation and abatement efforts at the 
refinery.344 The second Stipulation and Agreement also included more 
robust oversight mechanisms, including additional third-party 
monitoring.345 As DOL Secretary Hilda L. Solis then emphasized: 
“[T]his agreement provides an unprecedented level of oversight of BP’s 
safety program including regular meetings with [the Occupational 
                                                                                                                 
663. OSHA, therefore, contemplates a role for the DOJ in any OSHA enforcement 
action. The DOL does, however, possess significant discretion to settle such matters 
including the creation of oversight programs. Id. 
 340. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, BP to pay $50.6 million to resolve US 
Labor Department litigation (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owa 
disp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=18156. 
 341. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Fines BP Products North 
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 342. See BP Products North America, Inc. Settlement Agreement, available at 
http://www.osha.gov/as/oc/BPSettlementAgreementFinalDoc.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2010). 
 343. See OSHA Fact Sheet, BP History Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/bphistory.html, (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
 344. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 340. 
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Safety and Health Administration], frequent site inspections, and the 
submission of quarterly reports . . . .”346 
Independent third-party experts, or “Independent Verifiers,” play a 
key role in the resolution scheme and are responsible for reviewing and 
verifying that BP “is completing the required abatement actions . . . 
[and] properly documenting completion.”347 Each Independent Verifier 
is tasked with overseeing a separate aspect of the remediation and 
abatement efforts contemplated in the agreement. An individual 
Independent Verifier is not, however, prohibited from fulfilling more 
than one oversight role.348 
The Independent Verifiers are granted liberal access to BP’s 
corporate records and facilities, as BP is required to “make available all 
employees, including hourly and skilled (craft) employees, and 
contractors, and all information (e.g., documents) requested to the 
Independent Verifiers.”349 In turn, the Independent Verifiers are to 
submit quarterly progress reports to the DOL, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, and specified parties at BP.350 The 
Stipulation and Agreement does contemplate a role for BP officials in 
the Independent Verifiers’ tasks, stating that while the Independent 
Verifiers will “rely on their own skills, experience and professional 
judgment,” they must “also give due deference to the reasonable 
judgments of BP Products . . . .”351 The Stipulation and Agreement 
includes the following salient provisions with respect to the role of the 
Independent Verifier: 
Prior to each Independent Verifier’s commencement of work under 
this Agreement, BP Products and [the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration] shall collaborate regarding the scope of work 
described below to be performed by the Independent Verifiers, 
including review of the contracts and any amendments to be 
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executed by the Independent Verifiers. Employees and their 
authorized employee representatives shall be consulted in describing 
and deciding on the scope of the work. BP Products, [the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration], and the 
Independent Verifiers shall agree on the timing, nature and scope of 
the work to be performed by the Independent Verifiers before the 
Independent Verifiers begin work at the Refinery. In performing 
their duties under this Agreement, including when rendering their 
opinions . . . the Independent Verifiers will rely on their own skills, 
experience and professional judgment, and will also give due 
deference to the reasonable judgments of BP Products where 
allowed . . . .352 
iii. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
The DOL also oversees and regulates labor organizations.353 In that 
context, the DOL plays a key role in investigating and prosecuting labor 
racketeering cases that implicate RICO.354 While RICO actions are 
prosecuted almost exclusively by the DOJ, the DOL is heavily involved 
in monitoring and investigating labor organizations, typically in the 
wake of the DOJ proceedings.355 
Congress expressly intended that RICO’s remedial provisions be 
“liberally construed” to effectuate its “enhanced sanctions and new 
remedies” laying the groundwork for its reputation as a “‘far-reaching 
civil enforcement scheme.’”356 The DOJ has described an array of 
“potentially intrusive remedies” available to prosecutors under RICO’s 
civil provisions including “injunctive relief, reasonable restrictions on 
defendants’ future activities, disgorgement of unlawful proceeds, 
divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, removal from positions in an 
entity, and appointment of court officers to administer and supervise the 
affairs and operations of defendants’ entities and to assist courts in 
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monitoring compliance with courts’ orders and in imposing sanctions 
for violations of courts’ orders.”357 
Private sector third-party trustees have played an important role in 
the resolution of many civil RICO actions.358 Trustees are generally 
appointed pursuant to the terms of a consent agreement between the 
DOJ and the labor union. Among other matters, the trustees “administer 
the affairs and operations of corrupted unions and related entities, and 
assist the courts in monitoring compliance with the courts’ orders and in 
imposing sanctions for violations of the courts’ orders.”359 In the lion’s 
share of the cases, “formal selection of the trustee has been left up to the 
presiding judge, with both the government and the union making 
recommendations.”360 Appointed trustees have, for the most part, been 
former federal prosecutors with experience in investigating and 
prosecuting organized crime.361 
iv. The Fair Labor Standards Act 
The DOL also oversees and regulates wage standards, including 
those dictating the minimum wage and overtime rules.362 The Fair Labor 
Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. provides the 
general parameters for these regulations.363 Pursuant thereto, the DOL 
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to pursue 
equitable relief or to recover damages related to wages, salary, 
employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost by an 
employee.364 The FLSA allows for injunctive relief to restrain such 
violations and “other equitable relief as may be appropriate, including 
employment, reinstatement, and promotion.”365 
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Independent monitors have also been imposed as part of settlement 
agreements resolving FLSA-based actions.366 This has occurred in a 
variety of contexts, but has been particularly prominent in the garment 
industry.367 The DOL has long targeted such companies for violating 
worker rights provided under the FLSA and other laws. Resulting 
consent agreements between the DOL and such companies have often 
included third-party oversight.368 Accordingly, many apparel companies 
have “agreed to use independent monitors from ‘for-profit’ auditing 
firms or [to] send inspectors into contract factories to audit the payroll 
records of their contractors.”369 
B. TRANSNATIONAL SETTINGS 
1. Corporate Oversight Abroad 
Prosecutions of, and enforcement proceedings against, business 
organizations historically has been viewed as a peculiarly American 
phenomenon, with most overseas inquiries focusing on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act.370 Over the past decade, however, the DOJ and 
the SEC have increasingly collaborated with their counterparts in 
Canada, Western Europe and elsewhere. 
On November 15, 2006, Munich law enforcement officials 
searched the corporate offices of Siemens AG and certain of its high-
level employees as part of an investigation into the bribery of foreign 
officials.371 Shortly after the raid in Munich, Siemens self-reported 
possible FCPA violations to the SEC and the DOJ.372 During the ensuing 
two years, the DOJ and the Commission worked together with the 
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German authorities to investigate thoroughly the company’s activities.373 
In December 2008, Siemens resolved the DOJ’s and the SEC’s concerns 
through an agreement that imposed a corporate monitor and required the 
payment of $800 million in fines; $450 million of which the DOJ 
collected and the Commission received the remainder.374 The company 
also resolved matters with the public prosecutor in Munich, agreeing to 
pay EUR 395 million (approximately $569 million).375 Commenting on 
the investigation and resolution, then Director of the Enforcement 
Division of the SEC, Linda Thomsen, characterized the case as 
groundbreaking with respect to the coordinated law enforcement effort 
between the United States authorities and foreign prosecutors.376 
The DOJ and the Commission now routinely pursue their corporate 
targets with the active assistance of foreign national and local 
authorities.377For example, the investigation of Hollinger International, 
Inc. was conducted and overseen by the SEC with “the assistance and 
cooperation” of the Ontario Securities Commission.378 In that case, the 
Commission selected Mr. Breeden as the Special Monitor. 
Similarly, in December 2010, the DOJ and SEC announced the 
resolution of a joint FCPA investigation that included the entry of a 
DPA and a payment of more than $137 million in fines to American 
authorities, and the appointment of a corporate monitor.379 The case 
flowed from an investigation that Costa Rican authorities initiated into 
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bribes that consultants of an Alcatel-Lucent affiliate allegedly had paid 
to public officials, political parties and representatives of the Costa 
Rican state-owned telephone company to gain procurement contracts 
there.380 In a history-making settlement for the Costa Rican government, 
Alcatel-Lucent became the first foreign company to pay damages to 
resolve corruption charges.381 French authorities also are investigating 
the company.382 
The DOJ/SEC inquiry and the resulting DPA resolved charges of 
corrupt payments not only to Costa Rican officials, but also to 
authorities in Honduras, Taiwan and Malaysia, to secure business 
opportunities in those countries.383 Alcatel-Lucent also admitted to 
FCPA violations in connection with third-parties it retained in Kenya, 
Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Ivory Coast, Angola, Uganda 
and Mali, that netted the company over $48 million in profits.384 The 
DPA requires the imposition of a corporate monitor for a three-year 
term.385 The monitor, who will oversee the company’s continued 
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Controversies, ALCATEL-LUCENT.COM, (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.alcatel-
lucent.com/csr/htm/en/pdf/(Controversies_Investigations_In_France_eng.pdf. 
 383. See DOJ Alcatel-Lucent FCPA Investigation Resolution Press Release, supra 
note 379; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 
10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Alcatel Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement]. 
 384. See DOJ Alcatel-Lucent FCPA Investigation Resolution Press Release, supra 
note 379; Alcatel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 379. 
 385. Alcatel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 379, ¶¶ 3, 13. Under the 
DPA, Alcatel-Lucent is empowered to propose to the DOJ three monitor candidates, 
and to express its preference. The Department reserves the right to select the monitor 
from the candidates proposed by Alcatel-Lucent; the DOJ could also reject all of the 
nominees and require the company to propose additional candidates. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The 
monitor candidates must have expertise on the FCPA and French anti-corruption laws, 
experience developing and implementing compliance policies, procedures, and internal 
control mechanisms, especially such as would be designed to address FCPA and anti-
corruption issues; “the ability to access and deploy resources as necessary to discharge” 
her duties; and independence from Alcatel-Lucent. Id. ¶ 10. The DPA further requires 
the monitor to conduct three annual reviews of the company and issue a report, and 
each review shall be preceded by a written work plan which is submitted for review and 
comment to the company and the French authority selected by the DOJ. Id. attach. D ¶ 
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implementation of a FCPA compliance program and review and make 
recommendations to bolster the company’s internal controls, policies 
and procedures, must make annual reports to the Government.386 
Coordinated complex transnational enforcement proceedings are 
now commonplace, and have resulted in the appointment of independent 
private sector monitors with substantial cross-border reporting lines.387 
For example, the monitor appointed in the Siemens case was, for the 
first time, a non-U.S. monitor—a former German finance minister.388 
While the monitor appointed in the Statoil case was an American, the 
deferred prosecution agreement required that the monitor’s activities 
“not be contrary to Norwegian law” and that all confidential company 
business information be maintained “in conformity with Norwegian 
law.”389 In addition, where regulatory jurisdictions overlap, the 
                                                                                                                 
3. The DOJ has the decision authority to resolve any dispute with respect to the work 
plan. Id. The initial report is due within 120 days of the monitor’s initial review, which 
must start within 120 days of the monitor’s engagement. The monitor’s reports are to be 
issued simultaneously to both the company and the designated French authority, who 
would then transmit the report to the DOJ. Id. attach. D ¶ 4. Upon receipt of the 
monitor’s report, Alcatel-Lucent is to adopt the recommendations within 120 days or, 
within 60 days, object in writing to the monitor concerning any recommendation it 
finds impracticable and propose an alternative course of action. In that event, the 
monitor and company must then negotiate the resolution of the disputed 
recommendation; if unable to do so, the DOJ is the final decision maker as to what 
recommendation to implement. Id. attach. D ¶ 5. In the event the monitor discovers 
misconduct, she may report the matter directly to Alcatel-Lucent’s General Counsel or 
the Audit Committee of the company’s Board of Directors. Id. attach. D ¶ 8. Depending 
on the circumstances, including implications for French law, the monitor is empowered 
to report misconduct directly to the DOJ, if not the designated French authority, who 
may then inform the Department. Id. 
 386. Id. attach. D ¶¶ 1, 4. 
 387. See, e.g., id. attach. D ¶¶ 2(b) (requiring the company, at the request of the 
monitor, to notify the monitor and any French authority appointed by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, who then may report to the U.S. Department of Justice in 
accordance to French law); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Technip 
S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010) [hereinafter Technip Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement] (urging consultation with France’s Central Service for the 
Prevention of Corruption, an adjunct of the French Ministry of Justice, and consultation 
with French authorities, as appropriate). 
 388. BRUCE YANNETT, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: AN OVERVIEW, 1814 
PLI/CORP 721, 755 (May 19, 2010). 
 389. Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA 
Enforcement, Shearman & Sterling, October 1, 2009; see also Technip Deferred 
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possibility of conflicting or competing regulations is much greater than 
in an investigation run by just one agency.390 This increases the 
likelihood of conflicting demands on a corporate monitor as well. 
2. The United Kingdom 
a. Regulatory Initiatives 
In the United Kingdom, the two agencies with primary 
responsibility for prevention and prosecution of corporate fraud and 
corruption are the Serious Fraud Office (the “SFO”) and the Financial 
Services Authority (the “FSA”).391 The SFO prosecutes cases of 
corporate corruption occurring within the United Kingdom or overseas. 
Until 2008, the SFO was often criticized for its “lackluster” prosecution 
record.392 In the past two years, however, the agency has adopted new 
guidelines for the prosecution of transnational bribery and corruption 
offenses and has achieved success with Civil Recovery Orders (“CRO”), 
                                                                                                                 
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 387 (requiring certain aspects of the DPA and 
monitor’s duties to comply with French law). 
 390. LINDA CHATMAN THOMSEN, DOMINICK D. BARBIERI & MATHEW S. MILLER, 
DEALING WITH MULTIPLE REGULATORS: REFLECTIONS ON PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS, 
REGULATORS’ DIFFERING ROLES, AND ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN REPRESENTING 
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS, Practicing Law Institute Order No. 19278 (2009). The 
Alcatel-Lucent DPA provides a further example where the monitor was required to be a 
French national whose expertise included the anti-corruption provisions of French law 
who had reporting obligations to the DOJ that were to be facilitated by a “French 
Authority identified by the Department.” Alcatel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
supra note 383, ¶ 10, attach. D ¶ 2(b). 
 391. See Sarah Cleary & Lucy Candey, Who’s Watching You? Rise of Corporate 
Monitoring (2010), available at http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/fraud-and-
corporate-crime/7981-whos-watching-you-rise-of-corporate-monitoring; see also 
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, APPROACH OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE TO DEALING WITH 
OVERSEAS CORRUPTION (2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/128701/ 
approach%20of%20the%20serious%20fraud%20office%20v6.pdf [hereinafter SFO 
Approach]. 
 392. RICHARD CRAIG SMITH ET AL., Recent International Anti-Corruption 
Enforcement Efforts & Compliance Guidance, FULBRIGHT BRIEFING (2009), available 
at http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=4271 
&site_id=494 (last visited June 17, 2010); see also Lecture, ICID, Talking Corruption 
With the SFO: Presentation by Richard Alderman, Director Serious Fraud Office (Oct. 
20, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director’s-speeches 
/speeches-2009/talking-corruption-with-the-sfo.aspx. 
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resolutions which include various conditions.393 They are modeled after 
the DOJ guidelines for prosecution of a corporation laid out in the Filip 
Memorandum.394 
Adopted in 2009, the guidelines, titled “Approach of the Serious 
Fraud Office to Dealing with Overseas Corruption” (the “SFO 
Approach”) and “Attorney General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions in 
Cases of Serious or Complex Fraud” (the “SFO Guidelines”), read very 
similarly to the Filip Memorandum and its predecessors.395 Of primary 
importance in the SFO guidelines are corporate self-regulation, self-
reporting if wrongdoing is uncovered, and continued monitoring. 
Voluntary disclosure is perhaps the most important consideration in the 
SFO’s decision whether to resolve an inquiry through a civil agreement 
or a criminal plea.396 The SFO may not appoint a monitor on its own. 
Any such appointment must be part of a civil agreement between the 
parties or through the criminal courts.397 Under the guidelines, a monitor 
must be “an independent, well-qualified individual nominated by the 
corporate and accepted by [the SFO].”398 The scope of a monitorship is 
set forth in the agreement between the corporation and the SFO; it must 
be “proportionate to the issues involved.”399 
b. Case Studies 
i. Balfour Beatty, PLC 
In SFO v. Balfour Beatty PLC, the SFO reached a civil resolution 
after the company self-reported payment “irregularities” and false 
accounting relating to the construction of the Alexandria Library in 
                                                                                                                 
 393. See generally SFO Approach, supra note 391; Attorney General, Attorney 
General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions in cases of Serious or Complex Fraud, 
ATTORNEYGENERAL.GOV.UK, (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.attorney 
general.gov.uk/Publications/Documents/AG’s%20Guidelines%20on%20Plea%20Discu
ssions%20in%20Cases%20of%20Serious%20or%20Complex%20Fraud.pdf. 
[hereinafter, SFO Guidelines] 
 394. Cleary & Candey, supra note 391. 
 395. See generally SFO Approach, supra note 391; SFO Guidelines, supra note 393. 
 396. SFO Approach, supra note 391, ¶¶ 22, 24. 
 397. See SFO Approach ¶ 14. 
 398. See SFO Approach, supra note 391, ¶ 14. 
 399. See SFO Approach, supra note 391, ¶ 14. 
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Egypt in 2001.400 Though Balfour Beatty denied that these payment 
“irregularities” were bribes, it did accept as part of the settlement 
agreement that the payments and false accounting were unlawful.401 
Balfour Beatty paid a £2.25 million civil settlement payment and agreed 
to contribute to the legal costs of the SFO proceeding.402 It also agreed 
to submit to a period of external monitoring.403 
ii. Mabey & Johnson, Ltd. 
R. v. Mabey & Johnson Ltd. marked the SFO’s first criminal 
conviction of an overseas corruption since the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act of 2001.404 After pleading guilty to making corrupt 
payments in Ghana and Jamaica and to breaching the United Nations 
sanctions against trade with Iraq, the SFO and the company entered into 
a criminal plea agreement.405 Part of the agreement, approved by the 
criminal court, required the appointment of a corporate monitor whose 
fee was £250,000 for a three-year monitorship.406 
iii. Innospec, Inc. 
In a suite of cases involving Innospec, Inc. and certain of its 
subsidiaries ("Innospec"), a cooperative, world-wide investigation by 
enforcement authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom 
culminated with Innospec pleading guilty in the United States to 
                                                                                                                 
 400. See Cleary & Candey, supra note 391; David Leigh & Rob Evans, Balfour 
Beatty Agrees to Pay £2.25m over Allegations of Bribery in Egypt, THE GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 7, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/07/balfour 
beatty.egypt. 
 401. See Leigh and Evans, supra note 400. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id.; see also Cleary & Candey, supra note 391. 
 404. Id.; see also Gary DiBianco et al., Serious Fraud Office Begins to Achieve 
Concrete Results From Focus on Overseas Corruption, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher 
& Flom LLP & Affiliates Client Alert, Oct. 8, 2009; Press Release, Serious Fraud 
Office, Mabey & Johnson Ltd. Sentencing (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.sfo.gov/ 
uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009/mabey—johnson-ltd-
sentencing.aspx. 
 405. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Mabey & Johnson Ltd Sentencing (Sept. 
25, 2009), http://www.sfo.gov/uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009 
/mabey—johnson-ltd-sentencing.aspx. 
 406. Cleary & Candey, supra note 391. 
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conspiracy to corrupt, violations of the FCPA and of the U.S. embargo 
against Cuba, and to defrauding the United Nations.407 As part of its 
agreement to resolve charges brought by the DOJ, Innospec agreed to 
hire an independent monitor to review and evaluate its internal controls, 
record keeping and compliance practices.408 In the United Kingdom, 
Innospec's British subsidiary, Innospec, Ltd., agreed to pay a criminal 
penalty and pleaded guilty to making corrupt payments to a foreign 
government official to resolve charges brought by the SFO.409 As a 
result of the combined efforts of the SFO, the DOJ, the SEC and other 
agencies, the global settlement required Innospec to disgorge illicit 
profits, settle charges, and pay fines and penalties totaling $40.2 
million.410 
3. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
In 2008, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (the “OECD”)411 released “Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises” as a Supplement to the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the 
“Anti-Bribery Convention” or the “Convention”).412 The Convention, 
                                                                                                                 
 407. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA 
Charges and Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo 
Against Cuba (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-
278.html. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. The OECD is a forum of 30 countries which have joined to address the 
“economic, social and environmental challenges of globalization.” Its member countries 
are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
 412. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Anti-Bribery Convention]; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2008), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 
2011) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. 
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initially adopted on November 21, 1997, and updated on November 26, 
2009, seeks to combat bribery in international business transactions 
through a cooperative process of reporting, monitoring and mutual legal 
assistance between member countries.413 While the Anti-Bribery 
Convention does not expressly provide for the imposition of an 
independent corporate monitor, it does call for “company and business 
accounting, external audit, as well as internal controls, ethics, and 
compliance requirements and practices.”414 The Convention also 
requires each signatory to monitor and report its progress and level of 
success implementing the goals of the Convention.415 The costs of this 
oversight are to be assessed and handled through the normal OECD 
budget process, with cost-sharing measures to be adopted for monitoring 
of non-members of the OECD.416 
Whether the updated Anti-Bribery Convention and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises will be successful in 
identifying and combating bribery and corrupt practices in international 
business transactions remains to be seen. The Obama Administration is 
undertaking to collaborate with the OECD.417 On May 31, 2010, 
Attorney General Eric Holder delivered remarks to the OECD regarding 
the United States’ continuing efforts to prosecute financial fraud, bribery 
offense and other corrupt practices around the world.418 At the 
conclusion of his remarks, he invited prosecutors from all OECD 
member and signatory countries to gather at the June 14, 2010 meeting 
                                                                                                                 
 413. See Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 412. 
 414. See OECD Working Group in Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, (Nov. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/oecd-recommendation.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2011); Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 412. 
 415. See Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 412, art. 12. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Mark Brzezinski, Obama Administration Gets Tough on Business Corruption 
Overseas, WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052704154.html. 
 418. Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (May 31, 2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html (last visited Feb. 
25, 2011) [hereinafter Holder OECD Speech]. 
376 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
of the Working Group to discuss appropriate next steps in furtherance of 
this goal.419  
 
II. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE SECTOR OVERSIGHT:  
CONSIDERATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 
 
The imposition of independent private sector oversight raises a 
number of profound policy questions, along with practical 
considerations, regarding the charter for, and selection and deployment 
of, a monitor, a consultant or a review organization. Scholars and 
practitioners have thoughtfully explored some of these issues.420 We 
discuss below those which we have concluded to be fundamental to the 
construct. 
A. DEFINING THE ROLE 
In the resolution documents or the governing judicial order, 
enforcement officials, regulators and the company under investigation 
should make every effort to delineate carefully, and with particularity, 
the duties and responsibilities of the monitor, consultant or review 
organization. A certain degree of flexibility is warranted because of the 
substantial temporal duration of the ongoing oversight. At a minimum, 
however, the parties should make clear that the role is to monitor and 
not investigate the company’s affairs.421 
                                                                                                                 
 419. Id. 
 420. See, e.g., Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3 at 1724-25; David M. Lagaie, 
DPAs, NPAs Face Scrutiny As Their Numbers Increase, The Legal Intelligencer, Feb. 
27, 2008, at 1; James M. Keneally, Draconian Consequences of the DPA, 240 N.Y.L.J. 
9, (2008); Matt Senko, Note, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 178 (2009). 
 421. Without precise language that clearly and precisely defines the scope of the 
monitorship and the monitor’s obligations with regard to the company, disputes 
between the company and monitor may arise and one or both parties may attempt to 
steer the scope of the monitorship in its desired direction. A common, but preventable, 
result when the monitor seeks to expand her role beyond the mandate expressed in the 
resolution documents is “scope creep.” See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-
25; Lagaie, supra note 420. Absent clear guidance in the operative documents, a 
monitor’s duties may change over the course of the monitorship, making the endeavor 
much more costly for the company than originally intended or anticipated by the 
prosecuting document. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-25. Aside from 
scope creep, the absence of clear guidance leads to a lack of uniformity from one 
monitorship to the next—while some monitors are granted very limited powers to 
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Typically, the focus of oversight correlates to the enforcement or 
regulatory concerns that gave rise to, or were discovered during, an 
internal or public sector investigation. When resolving the matter, the 
parties should discuss and reach a well-documented consensus regarding 
the role of the monitor or consultant in the day-to-day operations of the 
company. Unless there is a legitimate concern that existing members of 
management are conducting themselves unethically or unlawfully, or 
that corporate data, information or records are being destroyed, the 
oversight should consist of observation, inquiry and reporting. It should 
not, expressly or implicitly, include the authority to approve hiring or 
compensation decisions, commercial transactions, financial matters or 
strategic plans or initiatives.422 Of course, was a company to consider 
seriously a merger, acquisition or divestiture during a monitor’s tenure, 
she should be so advised before the operative agreement has been 
negotiated and executed. 
In the same vein, the parties should create specific mechanisms for 
addressing compliance, legal, financial and operational concerns that 
might be identified by the company or by the monitor or consultant in 
the course of her work.423 They should include rational reporting 
                                                                                                                 
ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of the resolution, others are given very 
broad power, and may, in some circumstances, assume a de facto managerial role in the 
company. Lagaie, supra note 420. The government and company may avoid these 
pitfalls through more definite language delineating the scope of a monitor’s role and 
authority at a company in the prosecuting documents. 
 422. Another byproduct of the monitor’s imprecise scope is possible usurpation of 
corporate responsibilities. As one commentator has noted, “the chief problem with the 
implementation of an independent monitor is the unchecked authority the monitor has 
to alter corporate infrastructure and accumulate expenses without accountability.” 
Senko, supra note 420, at 178. While the company may disagree with the monitor’s 
recommendations or actions, where the government controls the monitor selection and 
appointment process the company may “have very little practical recourse for 
contesting perceived abuses or forcibly adopted policies.” Id. Moreover, the 
government may weigh the company’s decision to adopt the monitor’s 
recommendations when assessing compliance with the prosecution agreement. Id. Thus, 
the company may feel compelled to comply with impracticable recommendations only 
to appear cooperative and satisfy its bargain. Id. 
 423. In drafting and negotiating NPAs, DPAs and analogous resolution agreements, 
corporations should analyze carefully proposed “non-contradiction” provisions 
mandating that the corporation not make any public statement contradicting any factual 
allegation or criminal charge filed by the enforcement agency. Keneally, supra note 
420; see, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., 
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obligations that flow from the nature of the concern or allegation, 
evaluated in light of the underlying transgressions. Alternate reporting 
channels should include the Board of Directors, the General Counsel 
and the Chief Compliance Officer, and under certain circumstances, 
appropriate enforcement officials or regulators. If a need to investigate a 
matter arises, the resolution documents should set forth criteria and a 
procedure for law enforcement officials to evaluate the allegations or 
report and determine whether they, the Board or the company will 
handle the inquiry.424 
A critical and still unresolved question in this enforcement 
resolution model is how most effectively to supervise the work and 
resolve fairly disputes that may arise between the company and the 
consultant or monitor.425 Commentators have explored the notions of 
judicial and independent private sector oversight; the former “would 
eliminate monetary and other incentives monitors have to extend their 
own stay or recommend indictment.” 426 The DOJ has offered guidance 
through the Grindler Memorandum that the resolution agreements 
“should explain what role the Department could play in resolving 
disputes”427 between the company and its monitor, leaving it to the 
parties, in the context of their specific circumstance, to collaborate 
towards a satisfactory outcome for all concerned. 
                                                                                                                 
No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United 
States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010); Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp., Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. 
May 14, 2008); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. WellCare Health 
Plans, Inc., No. 8:09-cr-00203 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2009). A company’s ability to defend 
itself in private sector lawsuits can be impaired by any such requirement that does not 
acknowledge the organization’s rights in this regard. Keneally, supra note 420. 
 424. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-25. 
 425. As one commentator has noted, “the lack of judicial oversight of the monitor’s 
jurisdiction and authority may result in excessive and unfair burdening of corporate 
entities. For example, “some suggest that Bristol-Myers may have fired their CEO and 
general counsel to induce their monitor not to seek removal of the DPA.” Senko, supra 
note 420, at 178. In this respect, judicial monitoring could also allow the corporation to 
avoid less stringent enforcement of certain monitor recommendations. Id. 
 426. See id. 
 427. Grindler Memorandum, supra note 131. 




The lynchpin of the private sector oversight model is qualified 
independence. It is axiomatic that the monitor or consultant must be a 
neutral third party,428 and the integrity of the selection process has been 
perhaps the most highly publicized dimension of the scheme. In 2008, in 
response to a Congressional inquiry, the DOJ identified corporate 
monitor appointments over an eight-year period.429 Not surprisingly, the 
majority of persons selected to serve as monitors were former federal 
government officials, including at least twenty-three former 
prosecutors.430 One appointment became particularly controversial. In 
late 2007, the then United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey 
appointed the Attorney General under whom he had served, as the 
monitor for medical equipment manufacturer Zimmer Holdings.431 The 
selection occurred apparently without consideration of other qualified 
individuals or firms, and over a period of eighteen months; the attendant 
fees and expenses reportedly reached $52 million.432 
Congress thereafter initiated an inquiry into the Department’s use 
of deferred prosecutions and the selection of corporate monitors.433 
Remedial legislation, the “Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act,” 
was introduced in the United States House of Representatives in both 
the 2008 and 2009 Congressional legislative sessions, but to date, no bill 
                                                                                                                 
 428. Bart M. Schwartz, Becoming a Monitor and Getting the Job Done, SM05 
A.L.I. 425 (2006). As one author has observed, “red flags” include: “(a) any work that 
[has been] done for the parties previously, (b) requests from the monitored party . . . to 
do work that is not part of the agreement and (c) the use of the assignment to curry 
favor with one side or the other for future assignments.” Id. 
 429. Eric Lichtblau & Kitty Bennett, 30 Ex-Government Officials Got Lucrative 
Posts as Corporate Monitors, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A23. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Lisa Brennan, Pols Seek Controls on Monitor Picks in Light of Reported $52M 
Fee to Ashcroft, 190 N.J.L.J 895 (2007). 
 432. Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2008, at A1; Eric Lichtblau & Kitty Bennett, supra note 429, at A23. 
 433. See id.; Christopher J. Gunther & Robert M. Pollak, Scrutiny of Monitors is on 
the Rise: Pending Legislation and Recently Issued DOJ Guidelines Reflect a Concern 
Over Possible Conflicts, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 2008, at 1; Lisa Brennan, Bill Would 
Place Judicial Constraints on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 191 N.J.L.J. 259, 
Nov. 28, 2008. 
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has been enacted. The DOJ responded by issuing the Morford and 
Grindler Memoranda in March 2008 and May 2010, respectively.434 
One critical issue not addressed in the DOJ memoranda is the 
expertise and experience of the monitor. Enforcement officials, 
regulators, companies and monitor or consultant candidates must all 
recognize that to be effective, the oversight will require substantial 
expertise and that for years after the monitor has concluded her work, it 
might be scrutinized by legislators, the media and/or private sector 
litigants through their counsel. Monitors and independent consultants 
have been engaged by a broad array of companies including medical 
equipment manufacturers, health insurers, financial services firms, 
shipbuilders, and petroleum producers. Many former prosecutors who 
have been appointed as monitors have had little or no experience 
working in a corporation, much less the industry in question. It is in the 
interests of both the enforcement agency and the company, albeit for 
different reasons, to select a duly qualified monitor with the requisite 
personal expertise and experience or an assembled team that has the 
necessary capabilities. 
Ideally, by the time a resolution has been negotiated and executed, 
the administrative enforcement agency will be comfortable including the 
company, to some extent, in the selection process, an approach that 
leverages the disproportionate resources available to the respective 
parties.435 Through its General Counsel and/or its Chief Compliance 
Officer, a corporation or firm can develop, for the agency’s 
consideration, proposed criteria and procedures for selecting the 
monitor. Consistent with the principles enunciated in the Morford and 
Grindler Memoranda, a company can designate representatives to elicit 
proposals from, and interview, candidates for the monitorship. A 
comprehensive synopsis of the process, together with a thoughtful 
assessment of the candidates and a “short list” of recommendations can 
assist the agency immeasurably as it identifies candidates to be 
interviewed and ultimately selected.436 
                                                                                                                 
 434. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 92; Grindler Memorandum, supra note 
131. 
 435. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶¶ 10-11, United States v. Alcatel-
Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 
2008). 
 436. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶¶ 10-11, United States v. Alcatel-
Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution 




After a monitor or consultant has been selected, she and the 
company typically execute a retention agreement. If the monitor is a 
practicing lawyer, under applicable ethical rules, her receipt of fees from 
the company could be deemed to create an attorney-client 
relationship.437 This is, of course, at odds with the notion of third-party 
independence and neutrality.438 One possible solution is the creation of a 
trust with an independent trustee to administer the payments to the 
monitor. 
D. DEPLOYMENT 
Once a resolution has been negotiated and a monitor selected, she 
must begin the process of educating herself about the sector and the 
                                                                                                                 
Agreement, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 
2008). 
 437. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona’s Committee on the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Ethics Opinion 02-04 (Sept. 2002) (payment of a fee to an attorney is one 
factor to consider in determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists (citing In 
re Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516, 522 (1988))); 48 AMJUR 2D Proof of Facts § 52 (proof of 
payment of fees to an attorney may be “conclusive” evidence of an attorney-client 
relationship). But see Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 958 F. 
Supp. 869, 891 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1997) (finding that trustee’s lawyer did not also 
assume representation of fund absent “explicit undertaking,” even though pension fund 
paid trustee’s lawyer’s fees). In the Alcatel-Lucent DPA, the parties addressed this 
ethical conundrum through specific agreement that “the retention of the Monitor does 
not establish an attorney-client, auditor-client, or similar relationship between Alcatel-
Lucent and the Monitor that would otherwise prevent the Monitor from fulfilling its 
Mandate in accordance with this Agreement.” Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
Attachment D ¶ 2(a), United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 20, 2010). 
 438. Schwartz, supra note 428; see also Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, 
Principle II. The Morford Memorandum, for instance, states that a monitor is “by 
definition” independent of the company and the government. Id. at 4-5. Focusing 
primarily on confidentiality and evidentiary privileges and doctrines, enforcement and 
regulatory officials have taken the position that there is no attorney-client relationship 
between a lawyer and the subject corporation. This can leave the monitor and her law 
firm in an untenable position. 
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company. As expeditiously as is possible, she should develop a 
comprehensive work plan.439 
For even the largest and most sophisticated companies, a 
monitorship is a significant burden on personnel. Few firms have in-
house professionals who have worked with a monitor or an independent 
consultant. At the outset of the engagement, the company should 
designate a liaison, such as the General Counsel or the Chief 
Compliance Officer, to work directly with the monitor. A system for 
receiving and responding to requests for corporate records, site visits 
and interviews must be developed,440 and adequate and capable 
personnel must be assigned to the team to support the liaison. A protocol 
for conducting interviews of current and former employees should be 
crafted before any such work is undertaken; it should address, for 
example, what background information will be provided to individuals 
and who will be permitted to attend the meetings.441 
Corporate monitorships enable agencies to outsource a critical 
function at an attractive price; the company, rather than the government 
or the taxpayers, foots the bill.442 The fees paid to a corporate monitor, 
moreover, are not generally made public,443 and Congress and various 
                                                                                                                 
 439. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-25; James K. Robinson, et al., 
Deferred Prosecutions and the Independent Monitor, 2 INT’L. J. DISCLOSURE & 
GUIDANCE 325, 326-27 (2005). See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement Attachment 
D ¶ 3, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp., Inc., No. H-08-287, 
(S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008). 
 440. Materials should be processed through the legal or compliance department and 
they should be well-organized according to custodian and numbered, with an archive 
set maintained internally. 
 441. Counsel representing an individual in the underlying enforcement investigation 
should be notified promptly of a request for an interview by a monitor, and upon 
request, be permitted to attend. By contrast, in most cases, monitors and consultants can 
be expected to request that in-house or outside counsel to the company not participate 
in such sessions. 
 442. See Sue Reisinger, Someone to Watch Over You, CORP. COUNS., Sept. 20, 
2007. 
 443. Because many corporations that have been subject to a monitorship are 
publicly traded, some argue that the corporation’s shareholders have a right to know 
how much money is being paid to the monitor. In the case of AIG, members of 
Congress have recently argued that the taxpayers, by virtue of the government’s equity 
stake in the company, have a right to review the fees paid to and reports prepared by 
James Cole to understand whether the fees paid to the monitor were properly spent. 
Thomas Brom, Monitoring the Monitors, Daily Journal Corp. (quoting letter from 
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stakeholders have repeatedly called for greater accountability and 
transparency in the selection of and fees paid to corporate monitors.444 
Monitors usually are required to report periodically to enforcement 
officials on the company’s compliance with the terms of the agreement 
and the underlying applicable statutes and regulations. The frequency of 
such submissions is typically quarterly or semi-annually.445 Over the 
years, a number of approaches have been adopted with respect to 
informing the Board of Directors and the senior management team of 
the monitor’s findings and observations. It is now common practice to 
require the monitor to submit her report simultaneously to the regulators 
and to the company.446 The corporation is thereafter afforded an 
opportunity to respond to the submission. If a material disagreement 
crystallizes, the agency resolves it definitively with no right of appeal.447 
                                                                                                                 
Congress to SEC requesting disclosure of reports prepared by AIG monitor, James 
Cole); Sue Reisinger, AIG’s Fall Raises Questions About Corporate Monitoring, CORP. 
COUNS., June 23, 2009 [hereinafter Reisinger, AIG’s Fall]; Sue Reisinger, It’s Broken, 
CORP. COUNS., July 1, 2009 [hereinafter Reisinger, It’s Broken]. 
 444. Accountability, Transparency, and Uniformity in Corporate Deferrred and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Administrative Law, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Rep. Bill 
Pascrell, Jr.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Pascrell090625.pdf; 
Lisa Brennan, supra note 431, at 873; Reisinger, AIG’s Fall, supra note 443; Reisinger, 
It’s Broken, supra note 443. In fact, the proposed “Accountability in Deferred 
Prosecution Act of 2008” requires that a monitor be paid according to a pre-determined 
fee schedule set by the federal courts. See Brennan, supra note 433. Yet, proposals 
supporting predetermined budgets are not risk-free, as “[o]ften times . . . a budget is set 
in the monitoring agreement, yet [the monitor] had no input in the process to help the 
parties assess the cost and to ensure that the job can be done for the budget already 
agreed to.” Bart M. Schwartz, Esq. Becoming a Monitor and Getting the Job Done, 
SM051 ALI-ABA 425 (2006). 
 445. See USAM 9-27.600(A) and (B)(1)(d); Thompson Memorandum, supra note 
87, at 5. Unlike DPAs, NPAs are not predicated upon the filing of a formal charging 
document and the court is not involved. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 
n.2. 
 446. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment D ¶ 4, United States 
v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement at Attachment D ¶ 7, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-287 
(S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment D ¶ 7, 
United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010); Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement at 14, United States v. WellCare Health Plans, Inc., No. 8:09-
cr-00203 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2009). 
 447. Thomas Brom, Monitoring the Monitors, CAL. LAWYER, May 2006. 
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Public disclosure of a monitor’s reports has typically not been 
required for a number of compelling reasons.448 The parties to a 
criminal, or quasi-criminal, resolution seek to promote a complete and 
candid flow of information between the monitor and the Board and the 
company’s employees. Both the ongoing dialogue and the monitor’s 
report are likely to include highly confidential, commercially sensitive 
and proprietary data and information. In addition, corporations 
inevitably voluntarily disclose internal and external allegations of 
improper, illegal or unethical conduct, as well as the findings and 
conclusions of internal audits and investigations, to independent 
consultants and monitors. Public disclosure of such information could 
compromise the integrity of those processes and hinder the company’s 
ability to defend its position in private sector litigation, such as putative 
securities class actions.449 Equally important, a legitimate fear of an 
unfair collateral attack arising out of public disclosure could discourage 
highly qualified candidates from agreeing to serve as a monitor, an 
independent compliance consultant or an IRO; law firms faced with the 
prospect of even specious charges spawned by public disclosure could 
discourage or even prohibit partners from accepting appointments. As a 
matter of public policy, administrative and enforcement agencies should 
restrict access to the reports submitted by an independent consultant or 
monitor, and they should take the position that those documents, and the 
company’s responses thereto, are exempt from public disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act or analogous state statutes.450 
Finally, the consultant or monitor must adopt a cloistered public 
posture that is consistent with her quasi-judicial role. This concern arises 
primarily in the context of the monitor’s interaction with the press and 
potential clients or customers of the corporation. The consultant or 
monitor should be aware that the corporation may “trumpet[] the 
presence of a [m]onitor as a way of satisfying customers that everything 
was on the up and up.” 451 For all of these reasons, the consultant or 
monitor should decline to interact with outside parties absent prior 
consultation with, and direct approval by, the enforcement officials and 
                                                                                                                 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. Such public disclosure would certainly shed light onto the scope of the 
monitor’s duties and reveal the troubles that gave rise to the monitorship. 
 450. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006). After discussing this issue with the 
enforcement officials, monitors and companies should mark all submitted materials 
accordingly. 
 451. Schwartz, supra note 428. 
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the corporation.452 The veil of confidentiality should remain in place 
after the monitor has completed her work. 
CONCLUSION 
As fiscal pressures continue to mount on federal, state and local 
agencies in the United States and sovereign entities in other nations, 
enforcement officials will increasingly turn to independent private sector 
oversight as a means of ensuring that corporate transgressors are 
rehabilitated and become compliant and responsible citizens in 
commerce. The need to adopt this model will be acute in industrial 
sectors fueled by public funds. It is inconceivable that domestic or 
international regulators will, in the foreseeable future, develop either the 
expertise or the resources to perform this function effectively. As the 
approach continues to be refined, in design and implementation, and 
private sector experience deepens, a new group of professionals will 
emerge. They will develop both industrial and regulatory expertise, and 
the unique perspective and judgment that are required for this pivotal 
role. Ideally, over time, their performance should help improve the 
quality of the governance and compliance dialogue in both the 
boardroom and the C-suite. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 452. Id. 
